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For many years the Naval Shore Establishment has exper-
ienced funding shortfalls in the area of real property
maintenance. As a result, the Backlog of Maintenance and
Repair (BMAR) projects has increased at a steady rate with
the total now approaching 550 million dollars. There was
growing concern at the CNO and Congressional levels that
maintenance deficiencies have significantly reduced the Navy's
capability to meet its national defense mission.
The Chief of Naval Operations through his Director, Shore
Facilities Programming Division, GP-kk, recognized the seri-
ousness of the problem and initiated several programs direct-
ed toward clearly and concisely defining the backlog and ob-
taining funds to (1) reduce the nondeferrable backlog to zero,
and (2) to insure sufficient maintenance money is made avail-
able on an annual basis to prevent its recurrence. The
"steady state" condition or no growth in backlog is directly
related to the minimum annual cost of ownership of the Navy
Shore Establishment.
This thesis explores the Public Works Center, San Diego
BMAR in some detail addressing such areas as definition, gen-
eration, accuracy, and true magnitude. Once this concept
has been fully developed, long range facilities maintenance
planning, including potential fund sources and programs
which could be utilized in reducing the BMAR to zero are ex-
plored. Lastly, the question of minimum cost of ownership is

discussed with a viewpoint toward identifying a reasonable
annual maintenance funding level which will prevent the
growth of any BMAR.
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A- 11 Budget: The annual budget containing planned work
load, proforma balance sheet and income statement,
computation of rates, and status of accrual pro-
jects, submitted by all NIF Activities via their
chain of command to NAVCOMPT, DOD, and OMB.
Annual Inspection Summary (AIS) : A facility condition re-
port which lists the maintenance deficiences in
existing buildings, structures, utility systems,
and other facilities.
Backlog of Essential Maintenance and Repair (BEMAR) : The
backlog of essential maintenance and repair consists
of those items of maintenance and repair as defined
in DOD Directive 7040.2 over $10,000 which cannot
be accomplished during the current fiscal year due
to lack of resources. An item is considered essen-
tial when delay for inclusion in a future program
will impair the military readiness and capability,
or will cause significant deterioration of real
property facilities.
"Cost of ownership": The minimum funding necessary to off-
set routine maintenance requirements of active facil-
ities. Funding below this level results in consump-
tion of plant assets and accumulation of nondeferrable
maintenance backlog.
Current Plant Value (CPV) : Today's cost to construct a
facility that is physically equivalant (ie. same
design, configuration, materials, building technol-
ogy, etc.) to a facility in the inventory; the cost
to replace in kind (ignoring wear-out)
.
Investment Category (IC) : A grouping of similar facilities
with related contributions to Navy missions such
as aircraft operations, waterfront operations and
utilities.
"Maintenance Floor" : Established by Congress and is the
amount allocated for maintenance, repair and alter-
ations (functional categories M and R) . Funds allo-
cated for this purpose are "fenced" , they may not be
used for other purposes, although additional funding
from within the activity may be applied to this pur-
pose at the command's discretion.
Ik

NIF - Navy Industrial Fund: A revolving working capital
fund. Navy Commercial or Industrial activities
chartered under this concept do not receive appro-
priations for operating funds. Their operating costs
are paid from the fund, and these costs are recover-
ed by charging customers for services or products
received and reimbursing the fund.
0P-2j4: Director, Shore Facilities Programming Division
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
OP-92: Director, Financial Management Division, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
PRIME - Priority Management Efforts The name given to that
portion of the resource management effort devoted
to preparing for the implementing systems for the
management of resources for operating activities.
Initiated in FY 1968.
Public Works Center (PWC) : A consolidation of activity
Public Works Departments within a geographical area
into a centralized organization to take advantage
of economies of scale and eliminate duplications of
management staffs and other personnel. The PWCs
are Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) activities.
Real Property Maintenance Activity (RPMA) ; A Department of
Defense term used to describe management and engi-
neering functions involved in shore facility main-
tenance and operation.
RMS - Resource Management System: A series of systems de-
signed to promote better management throughout
the Department of Defense by providing managers
with improved means of obtaining and controlling
the resources required to accomplish their missions.
Initiated in FY 1967.
Replacement Cost: The actual expenditure that would be
necessary today to construct a facility that is
functionally equivilant to the facility in the in-
ventory (ie. with today's standards and criteria;
today's building materials and technology, etc.)
15

Stabalized Rates: The concept of establishing rates at
the time of the A-ll Budget submission (12 months
or more prior to the start of the fiscal year) that
will remain effective for the entire year. This
concept was totally implemented by FY 1977. Prior
to that time NIF activities adjusted rates monthly
or quarterly with significant impact on customers
budgets. After implementation, customers budgets
were unaffected by cost fluctuations and NIF activ-
ities accrued the gains and losses and considered





The Navy requirement for maintenance funds is based on
the physical plant condition of facilities necessary to
achieve basic Navy missions. Additionally, consideration
is given to providing maintenance funds to prevent severe
economic deterioration of facilities regardless of mission
impact.
There are three components which compose the Navy's
requirements for facilities maintenance. The first compon-
ent addresses the routine "cost of ownership" which in
general terms is the amount of funding necessary to offset
the routine maintenance requirements of active facilities.
This "cost of ownership" will exist regardless of past
funding levels or current condition of the plant. The
second component considers the marginal growth in the main-
tenance backlog which is the result of inflation and accel-
erated deterioration of an existing backlog. This aspect
of backlog growth is difficult to measure , and has the
potential for causing great impact on facilities condition.
The third component considers the resources necessary to
systematically reduce the nondeferrable component of the
maintenance backlog to zero over a specified period of time.
The reported O&M, Navy nondeferrable maintenance and re-
pair backlog was $4-86 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 1977- This
17

grew to $536 million in FY 1978 with a large percentage of
the total in aviation and waterfront operation facilities,
troop housing and messing and utilities. OP-44 directed
lOOfo inspection of these specific facilities in FY 1978
which accounted for the somewhat unusual growth of the re-
ported backlog.
Failure to fund the "minimum cost of ownership" over a
prolonged period of time has caused the nondeferrable main-
tenance and repair backlog to reach such a magnitude that
it is affecting the Navy's ability to perform its mission.
B. NIF MRP PROBLEM
The Director, Shore Facilities Programming Division
(OP-44) during review of the Maintenance of Real Property
(MRP) portion of the FY 1980 Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) 1
2A-ll budget noted the significant magnitude of the backlog
of nondeferrable maintenance and repair projects. In a
memorandum to the Director, Fiscal Management Division
(OP-92) , OP-^4 expressed concern that the Navy's NIF commun-
ity was consuming its physical plant in the interest of
maintaining as low a rate structure as possible (Appendix A)
Two alternative general solutions to the NIF backlog
were discussed. The first proposal would be to directly
NIF: See Glossary of Terms for definition.
2
A-ll: See Glossary of Terms for definition.
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fund "the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) NIF activities with
sufficient Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) resources
to eliminate the backlog in a systematic manner over a
reasonable length of time. A second method would he to
establish a rate increase to customer activities of limited
duration and use these funds to correct the backlog.
The Director, Fiscal Management Division (OP- 92) respond-
ed to these proposals with a compromise. He proposed estab-
lishing a dual funds channel with partial O&MN infusion
coupled with increased NIF stabalized rates to fund the
remainder (APPENDIX B) . OP-92 suggested the staffs join
forces on the problems, confirm its appropriate magnitude
and draw up a plan of action. Part of the OP-44 staff was
physically located with the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFACENGCOM)
. Since a large percentage of the
BMAR was identified at Public Works Centers (PWC) this area
received considerable attention from both offices.
C
. PURPOSE/METHODOLOGY
The Assistant Commander for Public Works Centers (Code 15]
at the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM)
was concerned about the significant growth in backlog of
maintenance and repair (BMAR) projects at PWCs. This office
sponsored this thesis, provided an initial description of
the problem and assisted in providing much of the input
data. The thesis addresses basic elements of BMAR in some
19

detail including actual procedures used in its generation
and validation. This aspect is directly related to the
magnitude question raised by OP- 92. Secondly, the "minimum
cost of ownership" was investigated, since this is related
directly to the growth of BMAR.
Using PWC San Diego as surrogate for the entire PWC
community, a methodology was investigated by the authors,
in consonence with the intent of OP-44 and OP-92 guidance,
to reduce BMAR to zero and maintain a steady state condition,
or "minimum cost of ownership," which would prevent a recur-
rence in the uncontrolled growth of BMAR.
20

II. WHAT IS THE BACKLOG OF MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIR ( BMAR ) ?"
A. PAST PROBLEMS WITH CREDIBILITY
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM)
utilized the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) as a
facility condition indicator and as a basis for justifying
requests to the Navy, Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and the Congress for funds. ^Ref. jJ7
This facility' s indicator was known as Backlog of Es-
sential Maintenance and Repair (BEMAR) until the early
1970's. It was officially supposed to consist of those
items of maintenance and repair over $10,000 as defined in
Department of Defense Directive 70^-0.2 which could not be
accomplished during the current fiscal year due to lack of
resources. An item was considered essential when delay for
inclusion in a future program would impair military readi-
ness and capability, or would cause significant deteriora-
tion of real property facilities. ^/Ref. 2/
The accepted target figure for total BEMAR was one
quarter of one percent of the Current Plant Value (CPV) of
real property facilities supported by the Operations and
Maintenance Navy (0&MN) Appropriation. Attempts to trace
the source of this "accepted" BEMAR figure proved futile.
However, its use in briefings, correspondence and instruc-
tions led to a general acceptance of that figure as the




the BEMAR steadily grew to levels substantially above the
one quarter of one percent figure, reaching $630 million
in FY 1977 (Figure 1)
.
This rapid growth in BEMAR occurred without any ap-
parent deleterious effect upon the operation of the Navy.
If all of the items included in the BEMAR were truly
"essential" to mission readiness as the definition implied,
then how did it reach such proportions without its affects
becoming apparent? This kind of question was being asked
by Congress, OSD (Comptroller) and the Bureau of the Budget.
The result was a gradual decline in the credibility associ-
ated with the BEMAR figure and its usefulness in funding
justifications was diminished.
The strongest criticism was directed toward the term
"essential" and how it was defined. Many felt there could
be no such thing as an essential maintenance deficiency
under the unilinear Navy concept. The Commanding Officer
received a single expense operating budget and he could
spend the money in any way he felt justified, except for
the Congressionally directed maintenance floor. This meant
he would have funded those maintenance deficiences which
impaired his military readiness and capability. Stated
in terms of a larger scale, the services would fund the
essential items so there could be no such thing as BEMAR.
22

B. OP-44 TO PURIFY AND VALIDATE BMAR
The Chief of Naval Operations through his Real Property
Maintenance Activity (RPMA) staff of 0P--44 recognized the
critical need to establish credibility in the concept of
using the backlog of maintenance and repair as a true
indicator of the condition of the shore establishment. Once
the BEMAR could be substantiated, it would again become a
useful tool in the justification of maintenance funding.
OP-ZjiJ- approached the credibility and validation problem
in two ways. First, the term "essential" was dropped from
the designation and it became the Backlog of Maintenance
and Repair (BMAR) . This was a cosmetic change only, be-
cause "essentially" remained in the official BMAR definition
as discussed in the next section. However, it removed much
of the stigma attached to the term. The BMAR itself was
purged of all items not requiring correction in the current
year as of the FY 1977 Annual Inspection Summary (AIS)
(Figure 1 & APPENDIX C). Second, in 1975 a management con-
cept was introduced which required the maintenance of pro-
files for each facility investment category (IC). Each
profile included an assesment of the condition of existing
real property and an assessment of the significance of the
military construction backlog. Based upon these assess-
ments program objectives were developed to indicate to the
Navy the CNO desires for long term trends. By relating
real property needs to operational requirements, credibility
23

was built into the programming and budgeting process. CNO
approved this management concept in August 1977 and it
served as guidance in the formulation of the Navy's Pro-
gram Objectives Memorandum (POM) 1980 ^Ref . ^/.
Dividing the maintenance of real property (MRP) into
eighteen investment categories (IC) greatly facilitated
identification of BMAR. Maintenance trend analysis could
now be accomplished by specific category in addition to
groupings by activity, major claimant or the Navy in total.
It was also an excellent management tool which assisted
the decision maker by enabling him to apply limited re-
sources to specific IC's.
k
Unfortunately, attempts by 0P-*»4 and NAVPACENGCOM to
completely purify the definition of BMAR were not totally
successful.
C. CURRENT (FY 1979) BMAR DEFINITION
The cornerstone of the maintenance and repair manage-
ment system was the Annual Inspection Summary (AIS) ; dis-
cussed in some detail in Section IV. The AIS was also the
basic source document for determining BMAR. CNO recognized
subtle inconsistencies in the reporting requirements for
AIS and issued a message clarification in March 1978 ,/Ref . £/
.
This clarification introduced the term Nondeferrable Main-
tenance Repair (NMAR) and its definition, together with an
implied definition for BMAR.
2k

Each major claimant was required to prepare and submit
two complete sets of AIS Summary Reports representing their
total claimancy. One set summarized the total of all known
reportable deficiencies as of 1 March 1978- The second set
summarized the Nondeferrable Maintenance and Repair (NMAR)
component of the AIS. Major Claimants were also required
to prepare and submit narrative assessments of facility
condition and narrative evaluations of mission impact of
not correcting the deficiencies for each IC.
NMAR was defined as a subset of the total validated AIS
deficiencies which, in the judgement of the activity
Commanding Officers and major claimants, required corrective
action during the current fiscal year. It was recognized
that NMAR represented deficiencies at a point in time,
1 March 1978, and would include projects for which funding
was planned during the period 2 March to 30 September 1978.
Deficiencies requiring correction during the current fiscal
year were subjectively derived but had to meet either or
both of the following criteria:
(1) The deficiency is mission critical and deferral of
corrective action beyond the current fiscal year
will adversely impact readiness.
(2) The deficiency is expected to result in accelerated
facility / equipment / material deterioration, and
deferral of corrective action beyond the current fiscal




Also, though net specifically discussed in the message,
those deficiencies covered by law or regulation which should
he accomplished during the reporting period would also
appear in the NMAR.
By deduction, when those projects listed on the NMAR
were completed during the 2 March to 30 September period
and then removed, the remainder should be BMAR. Conceptually,
the document and decision flow corresponds to Figure 2.
Attempts to purify the BMAR in accordance with the two-
part criteria were underway as early as 1977 and had re-
ceived some visibility. This was evidenced by George
Tomsho's NAVY PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT STUDY completed during
the summer of 1977 which noted that intensive study and
work was underway to develop and compile an accurate and
on-going backlog of maintenance and repair throughout the
Navy shore establishment. The assessment included only
that maintenance and repair essential to the operational
readiness of the base or that which could have major long
range economic consequences if not corrected ,/Ref .
€J
.
These modern definitions were quite similar to that
which existed for BEMAR in 1966 as stated in part A of this
section. The 1966 requirement that deficiencies be over
$10,000 was the only major difference, and this limit was
lowered to $1,000. Unfortunately, this was not the defini-
tion which was being used at the activity level.
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Prior to recognition of the lack of credibility asso-
ciated with BMAR. the official definition used in its
generation was the end of fiscal year measurement of main-
tenance and repair work remaining as a firm requirement of
the installation work plans that was not accomplished for
lack of resources during that fiscal year ,/Ref . 1 & 7J7.
The Public Works Center (PWC) San Diego most closely
followed the old definition in their generation of BMAR.
By aggregating all deficiencies by structure the restriction
of a minimum of $1,000 per item was usually exceeded and
the AIS closely reflected all known reported deficiences.
Specifics of the PWC San Diego AIS process are set forth
in Section IV.
J
It was clear that each activity followed a unique pro-
cedure, based upon their own perception of the definition,
to develop their summary. A uniform definition, understood
by all personnel in the chain, needed to be promulgated
by CNO through OP-44 or by NAVFACENGCOM to determine an
accurate BMAR.
Once the basic definition of BMAR was clear, two other
distinctions were required to develop a complete under-
standing of the subject. The appropriate subset had to be
identified. There was really no such thing as a total Navy-
wide BMAR. It was broken down into several categories
which appeared on Report 2 of the Type A Annual Inspection
Summary. The three major categories were Operation and
27

Maintenance (O&M) , Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) and Research,
Development Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities. Most
historical data on BMAR had been concerned only with O&M
funded activities.
The second key distinction concerned maintenance and
repair deficiencies reported on the AIS which were divided
into six deficiency codes (DC). (DC definitions are provided
in APPENDIX D.) Only DC 1 and 2 became BMAR and were shown
on AIS Summary Report 1. Deficiencies to be corrected by
complete replacement of a facility (DC 3 and 4) and demol-
ition of facilities no longer required (DC 5 and 6) did not
become part of BMAR. Accordingly, BMAR did not reflect the
total nondeferrable deficiency backlog, but only that portion
which was to be funded if at all, by the individual activity's
operating funds (ie. the O&MN, NIF, or O&MNR appropriations).
Both of the above were awkward and potentially confusing
methods of dividing and coding the Navy* s maintenance and
repair deficiencies and appear to be the result of attempt-
ing to conform to the existing appropriation structure. No
single appropriation category funded the total facilities
maintenance backlog problem and accordingly no indicator
designed to justify a particular appropriation could be
considered an adequate indicator of facilities condition.
At the time this thesis was written, the conditions des-
cribed above had not been corrected.
28

III. HOW LARGE IS BMAR?
This section discusses the size of BMAR, and its trend
in the late 60's and 70' s as recorded at various levels
within the Navy. The rationale for narrowing the scope of
this thesis specifically to the BMAR at PWC San Diego is
also discussed.
A. "NAVY WIDE" BMAR (O&MN) 3
The reported BMAR at (O&MN) activities at the end of
FY 1978 was 536 million dollars </Ref . 8J7. This represented
.98% of the current plant value (CPV) of O&MN supported
activities. BMAR had been growing steadily as reflected
in Figures 1 and 3» It is interesting to note in Figure 3
that after FY 1967, the rate of growth of BMAR increased
appreciably. This coincided with the shift from a central-
ized "single executive" for real property management
(NAVFACENGCOM) to decentralized resource managers (individu-
al activity Commanding Officers) as a result of the imple-
mentation of Resource Management System (RMS) in FY 196?
^The BMAR at O&MN funded activities was often called "NAVY-
WIDE" BMAR. This gave the false impression that it was the
total BMAR for all Navy activities. In fact, it did not
include BMAR for non O&MN funded activities (NIF, RDT&E,
O&MNR , etc.). Their BMAR was reported separately, and had
to be added together to arrive at a "Total" due to the
fragmentation of the funding and appropriation process dis-
cussed in the previous section. Such a "Total" was not
normally recorded.
^RMS: See Glossary of Terms for definition.
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and project PRIME* in FY 1968. It is not the intent of
this thesis to criticize RMS. It was pertinent, however,
that the "minimum cost of ownership" which exists regard-
less of past funding levels or current condition of plant
must be met or a backing will grow with significant future
economic and operational impact. Because this impact is
often "not on my watch," RMS does not provide incentives
for recognizing the "cost of ownership" as a current cost.
Maintenance funding (M funds) have been less than the "cost
of ownership" for many years. Any manager, decentralized
or centralized, who recognized and wanted to meet the cost
of ownership was still unable to apply funds above the level
included in his budget. As a matter of operational necessity,
funds initially budgeted for maintenance were often reallo-
cated to urgent operational requirements. This practice
led to the establishment of mandatory maintenance funding
7
"floors" by Congress.
The recognition of the cost of ownership at all levels
of budgeting and execution, and providing funds to meet this
cost, should be the basic objective of resource managers.
Any efforts to reduce BMAR or prevent its growth in the
future (the main focus of this thesis) cannot be effective
-'PRIME: See Glossary of Terms for definition.
"Cost of ownership" : See Glossary of Terms for definition.
7Maintenance "floors": See Glossary of Terms for definition.
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unless this more basic objective is met.
The reduction in BMAR which occurred from FY 1977 to
FY 1978, as shown in Figure 1, was caused by the redefini-
tion of BMAR in FY 1977- This resulted in the purge of all
deficiencies not requiring correction in the current year.
Actual total deficiencies were not reduced. This purging
was accomplished to conform with the rather restrictive
DOD definition of BMAR and to increase the credibility
of BMAR.
B. BMAR AT NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND ACTIVITIES
NIF BMAR was $185 million ^Ref. 8/ at the end of FY 1978;




The requirement to submit Annual Inspection sum-
maries (AIS) and BMAR reports existed for some time, but
due to differences in NIF accounting, funding, and budget-
ing methods, the reporting system had fallen into disuse
at NIF activities. Reporting was reinstituted in FY 1977
when CNO concern over the condition of Naval shore facili-
ties resulted in increased emphasis on Maintenance of Real
Property (MRP) funding, inspection, and reporting systems.
Accordingly, actual data on BMAR at NIF activities was
available only for FY 1977 and FY 1978.
2. NIF Funding Differences
All of the funds for maintenance and the majority of
the funds for the reduction of any backlog of maintenance
31

at a NIF activity came from its overhead budget or accrual
program. Those funds were generated by the rates paid by
its customers and not by O&MN appropriation. A NIF activ-
ity was therefore in the unique position of being able to
establish its own maintenance budget (within the limits of
certain external constraints, which are discussed in detail
in later sections of this thesis)
.
Two other categories of fund sources for the reduction
of BMAR were external to the NIF revolving fund and did
not effect the rates paid by customers:
a. Military Construction (MILCON)
Both the regular MILCON program and the dedicated
programs within it such as Shipyard Modernization, Energy
Conservation Investment Program (ECIP) , Pollution Abatement,
Fast Payback, Cold Iron, etc., could result in reduction of
BMAR by including replacement, repair, or alteration of
facilities that had BMAR deficiencies. Minor construction
costing between $75,000 and $400,000 was also funded from
MILCON appropriations.
b. 0&MN
Projects which may have reduced BMAR by replac-
ing, repairing or altering a deficient facility at NIF ac-
tivities could be funded by O&MN funds if they fell in one
of the following categories /Ref . %7
1. Maintenance or repair of unused facilities
2. Alterations to production facilities cost-
ing greater than $50,000
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3. MINOR construction $0 to $75,000 (except
alterations less than $50,000)
4. Restoration of facilities damaged by acts
of God or catastrophies costing in excess
of $50,000
3. Other NIF Differences
As stated in the previous section, a NIF activity
had much greater control than an O&MN activity in determin-
ing its maintenance budget. Since it did not receive a
direct O&MN appropriation for maintenance (M funds) it was
not subject to any maintenance "floor" (or theoretically to
any ceiling) . Since NIF BMAR was not needed to support an
O&MN budget, it was more a management tool, as a facilities
condition indicator, then a budget tool. It was, however,
used to support the A-ll accrual projects. Both of these
processes were instrumental in establishing, in advance, a
Q
NIF activity's stabilized rates.
The existance, at a NIF activity, of a large BMAR was
not a function of low appropriations of O&MN M funds. In-
stead it was a result of limits imposed at NAVC0MPT, 0MB and
Congressional levels on the amount NIF rates charged to
customers could increase from year to year, coupled with
the pressures which existed for NIF managers to keep rates
as low as possible. The result was the same predictable
tendency to defer maintenance when faced with pressing
o
Stabilized Rates: See Glossary of Terms for definition.
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operational demands that existed at O&MN supported
activities.
C. BMAR AT PUBLIC WORKS CENTERS
Public Works Centers are NIF activities and the general
description in III-B above is applicable. The PWC BMAR was
$58.2 million ^Ref. ip_7 at the end of FY 1978, which was
2.01?S of the PWC CPV at that time.
1. Why Focus on PWCs
In addition to the availability of sponsorship,
there are several other reasons why it was appropriate to
concentrate on BMAR at PWCs.
a. As shown in preceeding sections, PWC BMAR
stated as a percentage of CPV was larger than that of NIF
activities in general or of Navywide O&MN activities. All
were significantly above the J of one percent of CPV con-
sidered acceptable in the 1960's ^/JRef. ^7'
b. PWC assets, though a small percentage of the
Navy total, were utilized in providing maintenance and
utility services to customers who represented "}$% of the
Navy's shore facilities assets.
c. PWC BMAR was growing larger and any program to
reduce it would have significant impact on O&MN appropria-
tions either through special appropriations or increased
rates paid by O&MN customers.
3^

D. BMAR AT PWC SAN DIEGO
PWC San Diego BMAR was $M . 5 million ^Ref. llJ7 as of
1 March 1978, which was lO.lfo of their CPV. In addition
to this unusually high percentage there were several other
reasons why this thesis concentrated on BMAR at PWC San
Diego
s
1. PWC San Diego was the largest PWC in terms of vol-
ume of business (VOB) . It had an FY 1978 VOB of $113
million </Ref . 127 which was more than $30 million greater
than PWC Norfolk, the second largest PWC.
2. PWC San Diego is the second oldest PWC, having
received its charter in 1963«
3. PWC San Diego BMAR constituted the major portion
of BMAR for all PWCs in FY 1978 (See Figure 4).
4. PWC San Diego is reasonably close to the Naval Post-
graduate school in Monterey, which facilitated TAD and
telephone interviews.
E. PWC SAN DIEGO UTILITY'S BMAR
PWC San Diego utilities BMAR was $40.4 million /fef. 1%J
.
This is 97-372 of PWC San Diego BMAR {69 A% of ALL PWCs BMAR).
A look at the BMAR of other PWCs revealed that the majority
of BMAR at all PWCs was in utilities {95.2% of ALL PWCs
BMAR was in utilities).
With the exception of a description of how BMAR is
generated and a discussion of the validity of non-utility
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BMAR in the next two sections, the remainder of this thesis
was limited to discussion of PWC San Diego Utility BMAR
and methods for its reduction.
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IV. HOW IS BMAR GENERATED?
In research of existing instructions to define BMAR
and how it is generated, many subtle inconsistencies and
ambiguities were discovered.
Numerous phone interviews were conducted with staff at
NAVFAC and OP-44 in an attempt to obtain clarification. It
was found that the reporting system was not adequately des-
cribed in available instructions. The following descrip-
tion of the BMAR generation process is the distillation of
several directives and contacts with headquarters personnel,
It represents the BMAR reporting process as originally
envisioned.
A. THE PROCESS AS INTENDED
It was required that shore activities would conduct an-
nual "Type A" inspections of facilities, and that all facili-
ty maintenance and repair deficiencies found and still in
existance as of 1 March each year would be reported via the
chain of command to CNO (OP-44) . The total dificiencies
were to be screened and separated into two categories, de-
ferrable and nondeferrable . It was the major claimant's
responsibility to provide the activity with guidance as to
what should be considered nondeferrable . The major claim-




"Deficiencies which require correction during the
current fiscal year are subjectively derived, and must
meet either of the below listed criteria:
A. The deficiency is mission critical and defer-
ral of corrective action beyond the current
fiscal year will adversely impact readiness.
B. The deficiency is expected to result in accel-
erated facility / equipment / material deterior-
ation, and deferral of corrective action beyond
the current fiscal year will have severe adverse
economic impact" ,/Ref. ^J
Once this nondeferrable maintenance and repair (NMAR)
was determined, the major claimant was expected to remove
projects which would be funded and accomplished during the
remainder of the fiscal year (2 March to 30 September). The
resultant list was BMAR.
All deficiencies reported on the AIS were also required
to be assigned to one of six deficiency codes (DC)
.
Deficiency Code Description
DC 1 & 2 Maintenance, Repair and Replace-
ment in lieu of repair of less
than the entire facility.
DC 3 & ^ Replacement of an entire facil-
ity in lieu of repair
DC 5 & 6 Demolition of an entire facili-
ty in lieu of repair.
DC 1, 3, and 5 are for projects below, and DC 2, k, and
6 are for projects above, the activity's funding limitation.
A detailed definition of deficiency codes is provided in
APPENDIX D.
BMAR was used to indicate^ condition of facilities and to
justify appropriation of Operation and Maintenance, Navy
(O&MN) funds in subfunctional category M (Maintenance and
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Repair) . Only DC 1 and 2 deficiencies were appropriate for
correction with M funds, hence BMAR consisted only of DC
1 and 2.9 Deficiencies in DC 3 through 6, though part of
a backlog, were not part of BMAR. Items in DC 4, though
valid deficiencies, were not permitted to appear on the AIS
listing of total deficiencies unless they were included in
the five year Military Construction Program.
B. THE PROCESS AS DIRECTED
The basic concept and purpose of the AIS and BMAR re-
porting system was well described and accurately presented
in the following quotations
"Justification for programming resources in the
RPMA area is based largely on BMAR. BMAR is developed
from the AIS which in turn is based on the activity
inspection program. Without a comprehensive and current
inspection program the content of AIS and the result-
ing BMAR is not valid. Since the facility maintenance
of real property (MRP) function must compete for re-
sources with weapons systems and other priority pro-
grams, the foundation for MRP program and budget re-
quests must be sound and convincing, showing clear
relationships to fleet readiness or significant eco-
nomics. Even with such documentation the MRP program
can reasonably be expected to be sub-optimized in order
that overall Navy readiness may be optimized. When
placed in this perspective, the following management
concept for RPMA evolves:
a. On a continuing basis, activities must perform
thorough inspections of their facilities with emphasis
on those areas which, in the commanding officer's opin-
ion, are necessary to perform the stated activity
q
DC 3 is appropriate for correction with O&MN R (minor
construction funds), DC 4 by Military Construction, Navy
(MCN) funds and DC 5 & 6 by "other (&MN funds.
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mission. Close attention must be focused on those
items which affect the readiness of naval forces
assigned.
b. In a similar fashion, major claimants must
influence the activity inspection effort to emphasize
areas which have the most serious impact on the claim-
ant mission.
c. Although Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Field Division (EFD) and public works center technical
assistance may be utilized to identify deficiencies,
the final decision on prioritization of deficiencies
and assessment of condition is the responsibility of
the activity commanding officer and ultimately the
major claimant.
d. Once the inspection effort and the AIS have
been completed, the major claimant has the responsi-
bility of advising the CNO of the current BMAR and its
effect on the ability to perform the assigned mission.
BMAR requirements must withstand the scrutiny of intense
review. These reviews in some cases may involve on-
site inspections by OSD and other personnel.
e. Given a valid assessment of condition by the
major claimants, CNO (OP-44) will support a total RPMA
effort consistent with current and future requirements
for support of the naval forces." ,/Ref. \J
Though the basic concept was well described in instruc-
tions, the details of the intended generation process and
content of BMAR were either not included, poorly described,
or included only in instructions not distributed to field
activities. A field activity did not need to know every
detail or use of a reporting or budgeting process, but it
must know all details which effect its input. If these
details are not known, the input cannot be accurate, and
the system cannot accurately perform its intended function.
In the interest of clarity, only those aspects of the
intended process which are essential to valid input, but
^0

which are not available to reporting activities, were
covered in this section.
1. Screening for Nondeferrable Deficiencies
The DOD criteria that were intended to be applied
to the AIS to determine BMAR were not available to report-
ing activities. Discussions with FWC San Diego managers
revealed that few were aware of any distinction between
total AIS deficiencies and BMAR. Those that were aware were
unable to accurately cite the criteria by which nondefer-
rability must be determined. A search to find the criteria
in writing revealed only three locations in which they
appeared:
1) CNO MSG R2419^5Z Mar 78 /^ef . £/
2) SECNAV Instruction 1101A.11A ^Ref. Ij7
3) DOD Directive kl65. 2 $e£. 1^7
None of these documents were found to be available
at the field activities checked.
2. Deficiency Codes
As previously stated, BMAR was intended to consist
of deficiency codes 1 & 2 only. This fact was not readily
Item 1 is a message sent only to AIG Four Four (major
claimants) Items 2 and 3 were not available at the follow-
ing locations
:
NAVPGSCOL Monterey Admin Dept.
Public Works Dept.
Dudley Knox Library
PWC San Diego Planning Office
WESTDIVNAVFACENGCOM Maintenance Division
A copy of items 2 & 3 were finally obtained from NAVFACENGCOM

apparent from available instructions. The total on Summary-
Report #1 (APPENDIX E) and the subtotal on Summary Report
#2 (APPENDIX F) are totals only of deficiency codes I and
2. In official reports citing a specific number for BMAR,
the number cited was always the subtotal of DC 1 & 2. This
definition, based on usage, is the only documentation that
could be found of this distinction which people at the OPNAV
level treated as common knowledge. The significance of this
distinction was that deficiency codes 3 through 6 were not
part of BMAR and BMAR was not a true condition indicator.
It was an indicator of deficiencies correctable by O&MN
functional category M funds. There was no corresponding
indicator of maintenance and repair deficiencies correctable
by other O&MN funds or by Military Construction (MILCON)
funds. Some MILCON correctable deficiencies were unpro-
grammed and the magnitude of those that were programmed
was obscured by grouping them with alteration, expansion,
relocation and other new facility requirements.
3- Unprogrammed MILCON Projects
By definition, replacement of an entire facility
in.< lieu of repair is DC 3 or 4 and was funded by MILCON
appropriations. MILCON projects, however, could be in-
cluded in AIS or BMAR only if listed on the five year pro-
gram for Military Construction ,/Ref . l/\ Accordingly, a
deficiency of this type, though identified, could not be
reported until it was programmed.
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This thesis has focused on utilities deficiencies.
MILCON funding of Utilities projects has historically been
minimal and there is no indication that this climate will
improve. Some utilities projects may never get programmed,
hence theoretically may never be reportable under this
11
system.
It was possible to avoid this problem by phasing
repairs so that an entire facility was not replaced. This
allowed funding limitation to be observed, DC 1 and 2 to
apply, and O&MN funds were appropriate. This approach,
which is called incremenation and not permitted for struc-
tures, is permitted for utilities ,/Ref. 9_7- It is not
necessarily economical since the original justification for
replacing a complete facility in lieu of repair should be
that it is more economical than repairing or replacing a
segment at a time. When a system is more responsive to
an uneconomical approach then to an economical one, there
are really only two choices: 1) work to change the system
or 2) accept a less efficient allocation of resources as
the only practical method of meeting operational commit-
ments under an externally imposed system.
11PWC San Diego reported 30 . 8 million of unprogrammed
MILCON as FY 1979 BMAR (DC 2) wich was apparently removed
by NAVFAC after discussion with CNM, the major claimant.
^3

k. Screening for Funded Projects
Deficiencies which have not been corrected, hut
for which funds are available, and projects planned for the
current fiscal year, must be removed from the MS to arrive
at an accurate BMAR.
The CNO's March 1978 message /Ref. $/ implied that
this was a major claimant function. To be accurate, this
screening for removal must be performed at both major
claimant level and activity level in some coordinated
fashion. A major claimant may not know what deficiencies
an activity is planning on correcting within its level of
funding approval and operating budget, and an activity can-
not know what deficiencies can be corrected by additional
funds redistributed by the major claimant. If a joint
screening process was intended to OPNAV, it was not made
clear in the instructions available to reporting activities,
5- Major Claimant Guidance
Based on numerous discussions with the OP-44 staff,
it was determined that OPNAV s intention was for major
claimants to play a major role in the BMAR reporting proc-
ess. The OPNAV Instruction ,/Ref. %J was being rewritten
to clarify major claimant responsibility ^Ref 8J7, OPNAV
Instructions were apparently deliberately general in areas
where it was intended that major claimants provide detailed
and specific guidance. No written guidance from the Chief
of Naval Material (CNM) , the major claimant, or NAVFAC , the
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subclaimant , could be found /Ref . 1$/ . Verbal guidance
was apparently being provided by NAVFAC , and in amounts
that increased during the writing of this thesis. It was
not unlikely that some of the increase was due to questions
asked by the authors during the research phase of this
thesis.
C. THE PROCESS AT PWC SAN DIEGO
AIS t . The inspection process was found to differ for
utilities and for non-utilities. This resulted because
many utilities deficiencies were not detectable by conven-
tional inspection methods. Utilities deficiencies were
identified as a result of engineering evaluation and the
12
use of "state of the art" inspection equipment. This
process was too time consuming and costly to be performed
annually on all utility assets. PWC San Diego had estab-
lished a program of Utilities Systems Studies which is
described in detail in APPENDIX G. These studies provided
building blocks for a comprehensive master plan for ef-
ficient production, purchase, operation, maintenance, re-
placement / expansion, utilization and conservation of
utilities and utilities systems. The programming of projects
generated by this system was prudent utilities management,
12Equipment such as self-propelled TV cameras for inspecting




however, all projects generated might not have fit within
the rather rigid criteria for BMAR. It was the output
of this program more than conventional inspection which
provided input to the AIS. The reporting process as it
was observed at PWC San Diego is shown in Figure 5« Several
problems with this process were exactly as would be ex-




No Screening for Nondeferrable Deficiencies
There was no screening for nondeferrable deficien-
cies. Every item on the AIS, with the exception of those
marked for accomplishment by accrual, were designated as
BMAR. In other words, of all the deficiencies identified
at the center, none were considered deferrable.
2. All Deficiency Codes in BMAR
Every item on the AIS was either marked "A" for
Accrual or "B" for BMAR. Items not in Deficiency Codes
(DC) 1 or 2 , which by definition cannot be BMAR, were
marked with a "B". Though this error caused the activity
to think its BMAR was larger than the true BMAR, the true
total was available on both summary sheets as the total of
)C 1 and 2.
3- Unprogrammed MILCON Pro.jects in BMAR
Unprogrammed MILCON projects (at 30 . 8 million this
was a significant portion of San Diego's 4-1.5 million re-
ported BMAR) were reported as DC 2 and BMAR. They were
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subsequently removed from BMAR by NAVFAC at the direction
of CNM. The problem of how to give visibility to valid
requirements which did not fit in the rigid definition of
BMAR or the technical definition of AIS was not resolved.
k. No Screening for Funded Projects
Major Accrual projects were excluded from BMAR
by marking them "A" instead of "B". Cost center managers,
however, only removed minor projects actually accomplished,
not those planned. Accordingly, all projects accomplished
from 2 March to JO September with a cost center's over-
head budgets were not removed. Though small individually,
in aggregate, this was potentially a significant discrepancy,
5- No Major Claimant Guidance
It would not be correct to say there was no guid-
ance, however, there was none apparent in writing. What-
ever the' content of the verbal guidance, the discrepancies




V. HOW VALID IS THE PWC SAN DIEGO BMAR?
A. INVESTMENT CATEGORY MANAGEMENT
One of the first steps taken to restore credibility in
BMAR as a facilities condition indicator was the imple-
mentation of investment category management. The concept
first evolved in FY 1975 and was refined in subsequent
years. An Investment Category (IC) was simply a grouping
of similar facilities with related contributions to the
Navy mission. For example, IC-01 summarized all air oper-
ational property such as runways, parking aprons, hangers
and operational buildings; IC-03 summarized all waterfront
facilities such as piers, keywalls and transit buildings.
There were a total of 18 IC's in 1978, each of which rep-
resented a distinct operational area. A listing of all
IC's used in 1978 is included in APPENDIX H.
The IC management concept required that each major
claimant summarize the activity AIS by IC. CNO was pro-
vided a narrative assessment of the condition of real
property and an impact statement of this condition on the
ability to perform the assigned mission. Upon receipt of
the summary AIS, narrative summary, and impact statement,
the CNO analyzed the effect of real property condition on
the total Navy mission. Using the IC listings from the
major claimants, along with Current Plant Value (CPV) , age
of facilities, construction investments and past funding
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levels and trends, a "profile" of key indicators was pre-
pared for each IC Navywide. After analysis of the "profiles"
the CNO met with claimants at the Shore Facilities Program-
ming Board (SFPB) to discuss the relative importance of
individual IC deficiencies. Ultimately the plan was pub-
lished as a series of program objectives by IC's over the
long term.
The summarization process at the major claimant level
led to the identification of BMAR by IC.
B. PROBLEMS WITH DEFINITION
In January 1979. there were at least four official
documents which contained definitions of BMAR. OPNAVINST
11010. 23D, including Change Transmittal 2 of 10 July 1978,
and OPNAVINST 11010.34 of 21 July 1977 both defined BMAR
as follows
:
"The Backlog of Maintenance and Repaire is the end
of fiscal year measurement of maintenance and re-
pair work remaining as a firm requirement of the in-
stallation work plans prescribed by D0D Directive
4165.2...., but which lack of resources prohibit
accomplishment in the fiscal year."
The Real Property Issue Paper for POM 1980 (FY I98O-
1984) dated February 1978 did not clarify the definitional
problem. Much of the thrust of that document was directed
toward establishing credibility in the BMAR figure and
insuring those items listed were truly essential. The
paper stated, "The resultant Navy AIS can fairly safely be
assumed to be in strict accordance with a rather restrictive
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DOD definition of BMAR." However, in Tab A, Definition of
Terms , the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair was defined
almost identically to that in the OPNAV Instructions. It
read as follows
:
"The end of the fiscal year measurement of maintenance
and repair remaining as a firm requirement of the in-
stallation work plans but which lack of resources pro-
hibit accomplishment in the fiscal year. In this
sense, accomplishment implies obligation."
The definition says "firm requirement" and carries with
it no restrictive essentiality criteria.
CNO message 2^19^5Z Mar 1978 implied projects listed
on the AIS must meet the following criteria to be consider-
ed BMAR:
(1) The deficiency is mission critical and deferral
of corrective action beyond the current fiscal
year will adversely impact readiness.
(2) The deficiency is expected to result in ac-
celerated facility / equipment / material
deterioration, and deferral of corrective
action beyond the current fiscal year will
have severe adverse economic impact.
Interviews with personnel at OP-44 and NAVFACENGCOM
Code 15 clearly indicated this strengthening of the BMAR
definition by CNO was intended to clarify subtle ambiguties
in the definition and reinstate credibility in the reported
figures. Only those items which were clearly essential
were to be reported and BMAR had to be able to withstand
the test of close scrutiny. Personnel from both organi-
zations when visiting field activities made a point of
reiterating the definition promulgated in March 1978.
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However, the meaning of BMAR was still being inter-
preted differently at each activity. It was even found that
the definition being used differed significantly within the
PWC San Diego organization. The Planning Officer was aware
of some set of new criteria which must be met prior to an
item being considered BMAR, but he could site no official
reference containing the definition. He also recognized
the difficulty in identifying a uniform BMAR concept through-
out the organization.
The Planning Officer further indicated the PWC San Diego
AIS was annotated "A" for accrual projects and "B" for
BMAR projects prior to submission to NAVFAC , and that the
Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(WESTDIV) conducted spot checks of the AIS projects for
essentiality. The "A" and "B" notation system was locally
generated in the absence of other firm guidance. All line
items on the AIS are either "A" or "B".
The Supervisor of the Inspection Branch with responsi-
bility for conducting facility inspections which resulted
in the AIS had his own definition of BMAR which more closely
resembled the "old" one set forth in the NAVFAC instructions.
This was the level in the organization at which BMAR was
actually identified and entered in the AIS. In reality
BMAR was any line item over $1000 which had not been identi-
fied by a responsible Cost Center Manager as having already
been accomplished, or would be accomplished by accrual
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through the rates . There was no screening of individual
work segments within the $1000 aggregation and no upper
level management screening for essentially other than that
which was done by the Cost Center Managers. Restated, any
facility maintenance totaling over $1000 in the aggregate
which was not scheduled to be done during the current fiscal
year would be reported as BMAR.
Review, of a random sampling of Inspector's Reports used
in compiling the 1 March 1978 AIS showed many identified
deficiencies which were not essential or nondeferrable
.
Yet these same deficiencies were included in the AIS line
items annotated "B" for BMAR.
The Inspection Branch Supervision pointed out that the
AIS is sent directly to NAVFAC with a copy to WESTDIV and
that WESTDIV provides no screening or spot checks for
essentiality.
The Maintenance Assistant to the Cost Center Manager of
the Maintenance Department was contacted to determine how
BMAR was defined at this level in the organization. It
was found that only the AIS document had any significance.
The backlog for each specific cost center was the only
area of concern and it was managed through the subjective
judgement of the Cost Center Manager by deciding what work
to do during the current year. Anything that was left over
would be an accrual project or BMAR.
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It was obvious that more effort was needed Navy-wide
to provide facilities 1 managers with a concise definition
of BMAR, one which would provide a clear understanding of
the CNO's intent. Emphasis was needed to insure that man-
agers made the information known to all personnel associated
with the generation and validation of BMAR. The activities
had not been uniformly made aware of, or forced to recognize
the distinction between deferrable and nondeferrable defic-
iencies. Until this was accomplished, the credibility of
the BMAR figures could be suspect.
As a minimum OPNAVINST 11010. 2 3D and OPNAVINST 11010. 3^4-
needed to be changed immediately to reflect the new BMAR
definition. NAVFAC needed to issue supplemental written
guidance to the PWC's clearly outlining the procedures to
be followed in screening the AIS for deferrable and non-
deferrable deficiencies. Guidance similar to that issued
by the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) was
needed (APPENDIX I)
.
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE AIS
0P-44 and NAVFACENGCOM recognized that the cornerstone
of the maintenance and repair management system was the
Annual Inspection Summary (AIS). It needed to come from
effective, thorough and timely inspection by individual
activities. This was potentially the weakest element in
the BMAR identification process.
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NAVFACENGCOM Code 15 initiated a concentrated program
to develop a computer assisted Facilities Inspection System
(FIS) designed to improve the management of the inspection
program. San Diego was used as a pilot location for im-
plementation and evaluation. Once proven, the system would
be made available to all Navy facilities managers.
The new FIS was designed to provide the following
benefits
:
(1) Standardization of PWC method of managing the
Facility Inspection Program.
(2) A systematic approach to scheduling facilities
inspection.
(3) Identification of manpower requirements for each
programmed inspection cycle.
(4) Accurate facilities deficiency and inventory
information.
(5) Timely and reliable Type A AIS reports.
Utilization of sophisticated Electronic Data Processing
(EDP) hardware or software for the FIS was deliberately
avoided to prevent problems with systems compatability
which could restrict its usefulness. Data updates and in-
formation between the Facilities Systems Office (FACSO)
and activities would probably be accomplished by mail, using
floppy disks as the transfer media. This approach assured
even relatively small Public Works Departments with access




The biggest problem encountered in developing the FIS
concerned the existing available data base. The Naval
Facility Assets (NFA) data base maintained by the Facilities
Systems Office (FASCO) in Port Hueneme , California, was
not reliable and had to be manually validated. This was a
problem of tremendous proportions since it contained all
assets carried in the NFA and manual validation would be
necessary at every activity implementing the FIS. There
were also contradictions between the NFA data base and the
CNM automated AIS systems in size and content of certain
data elements which had to be resolved.
The FIS concept was very sound the promised to be an
excellent management tool for use in the allocation of
resources to the inspection program. The FIS effort also
coincided with OP-44's emphasis on identifying deficiencies
by IC and success in programming additional funds to provide
for 100?5 inspection of facilites.
D. PROBLEMS WITH INSPECTION
The essential element of the AIS, the FIS, the BMAR
and the entire IC management concept is inspection . As
previously discussed, the new definition of BMAR did not
reach the lower levels of the PWC organization where AIS
and BMAR were generated. Taking this into account, other
elements affecting BMAR validity increased in importance
and were researched within PWC San Diego.
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1 . Personnel Considerations
The basic organization of Public Works Centers was re-
structured in 1977- The philosophy behind the restructur-
ing and the actual details of the new organization are not
addressed in this thesis. However, it is important to note
the new organization separated the Inspection and Planning
and Estimating (P & E) Branches. Inspection is under the
Planning Office and P & E is under the Production Office
within the Service Department. The new Organization Chart
is shown in APPENDIX J. This created internal personnel
conflicts at PWC San Diego. P & E personnel were assigned
higher grade levels and had broader advancement paths than
did Inspectors. Personnel in the Inspection area consider-
ed it to be a "dead end" position. At the same time, the
Inspectors felt that they were doing P & E type work since
they prepared field estimates at the time the inspections
were done. The field estimate did not have the detail of
a full cost estimate made up by P & E personnel when a
project was costed. It was used, however, to quote customer
activities an initial price for planning purposes, and this
caused the internal friction.
The Inspection Branch was understaffed at PWC San
Diego and without outside assistance could not inspect all
the facilities for which it had responsibility in accordance
with the schedule set forth in the Inspection of Shore Facil-
ities, NAVPAC MO-322. This condition was made worse each
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time a new activity came under the PWC umbrealla as occurred
when NAS North Island was absorbed without augmenting PWC
Inspection assets. To correct the shortage, personnel were
detailed from the production shops on a temporary basis to
work as inspectors. Personnel did not normally volunteer
to leave the shops even for short periods. Advancement/
promotion paths were clearly defined in writing or informallly
established by tradition and absence from a shop for any
duration could result in loss of advancement opportunity.
The individuals detailed as inspectors received
no formal training and had little or no experience. They
presented some serious attitude and motivational problems
when placed in undesirable positions (from their perspec-
tive) which inherently received little direct supervision.
2. Level of Inspection
There was a direct relationship between BMAR and
level of inspection. Level of inspection is not particular-
ly concerned with how often facilities are inspected, since
this is stipulated in the MO-322, but how thoroughly they
are inspected. Inspections can range from a cursory drive
past a building in a vehicle to conducting a detailed
structural analysis. There is a cost/benefit break even
point somewhere between these extremes where deficiencies
discovered become less significant, than the cost of inspec-
tion itself. This is a very complex subject which could
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result in a thesis research program in itself and will not
be addressed in detail herein. However, the more thoroughly
a facility was inspected the larger would be the BMAR
figure, and that aspect is important to this thesis.
A review of a random sample of Inspector's reports
from PWC San Diego and discussions with personnel involved
in the program indicated circumstances forced the inspections
to be superficial in nature. The most obvious discrepancies
were receiving the greatest attention.
As noted previously, a field estimate was prepared
at the time a facility was inspected. This figure was based
entirely upon the degree knowledge and experience of the
inspecting individual. Only when the project had been ap-
proved for accomplishment was a detailed cost figure ob-
tained from the Planning and Estimating Branch. The rough
field estimate was used in both AIS and BMAR reporting. No
statistical analysis had been done to determine how closely
the initial field estimate approximated theP & E estimate
or the actual cost of project accomplishment. There was
a "feeling" at PWC San Diego that the estimates were pretty
good.
Inspection scheduling techniques, which the NAVFAC
FIS was designed to improve, left considerable room for
unintentional error. The MO- 322 provided basic guidance
on how often to inspect, but said nothing as to when the
inspections are conducted. Vagaries of the day-to-day
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Inspection Branch operations resulted in an erratic schedule.
When the inspection schedule slipped to 13 months or more,
some sort of indexing of the old figures was utilized for
the next AIS submission vice actual inspection.
Review of the 1 March 1978 AIS substantiated this
practice. Col. 1>, Date Last Inspected, and Col. 15, Date
Deficiency First Reported, were identical- for most line
items. Some dates were as old as June 1976. Perhaps most
importantly, Col. 18, Date of Last Estimate of Cost, showed
many cost estimates updated to January 1978 while the inspec-
tion dates remained unchanged. This implied some factor
was used to escalate the original field estimate but no
actual reinspection was conducted. Considerable facility
deterioration could have occurred which would be undetected
and not reflected in the AIS and BMAR figures.
3. New Inspection Programs
OP-44 recognized early in 1977 that effective,
thorough and timely inspection and reporting was the heart
of the facilities management effort. Two programs were im-
plemented to improve this area. First was the identification
of additional funding resources to provide for full inspec-
tion of all facilities maintained by NAVFAC PWC's. This
was a three-phased program which identified IC-01 Aviation
Operation Facilities, IC-03 Waterfront Operational Facilities
and IC-17 Utilities for full inspection in FY 1978, four
additional IC's in FY 1979 and the remaining eleven IC's in
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FY 1980. Additional funds in the amount of $1.7 million
in FY 1979 and $1.9 million in FY 1980 were programmed for
increased effort.
The second program evolved from the recognition
that deficiencies in major utility systems, piers, runways,
and POL storage facilities cannot be identified by conven-
tional inspection techniques until deterioration has reached
catastrophic proportions. To eliminate costly consequences
of delays in identification of deficiencies new inspection
techniques and equipment were being developed by the Navy
Civil Engineering Laboratory in Fort Hueneme , California.
Information on this program had not reached the PWC's by
December 1978.
Even though OP-44 obtained additional funds for a
full inspection program, PWC San Diego did not have suf-
ficient civilian ceiling points in the Inspection Branch to
hire more personnel to perform the work. Personnel at NAVFAC
and OP-44 indicated much of this inspection effort would
be contracted out to civilian firms. However, PWC San Diego
planned to detail personnel from production shops to fill
in the inspection ranks. The shops would then hire more
readily available skilled personnel on a temporary employ-
ment basis. This procedure would result in lower quality
inspections and field estimates than would be obtained from
contracting the inspection out to a civilian firm special-
izing in this type work.
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E. PROBLEMS WITH SCREENING FOR BMAR
In order to maintain credibility in the BMAR figure a
rational, uniformly applied, screening process had to
occur to separate the AIS into deferrable and nondeferrable
deficiencies. Only those items which could not be defer-
red because of operational needs or economic impact beyond
the current fiscal year should be identified for listing on
the BMAR. The screening technique was intended to force
the lowest responsible level of management to recognize the
relative importance of various deficiencies, thus ensuring
mission related deficiencies received the highest priority.
PWC San Diego had a Facilities Review Board whose
members included the Executive Officer, Production Officer,
Planning Officers and Comptroller. The Board had responsi-
bility for establishing priorities for accomplishment of
nondeferrable deficiencies. To some degree, they also at-
tempted to identify alternate fund sources to pay for
specific categories of projects. Alternate sources included
Military Construction (MILCON) , minor construction, major
claimant special project funds, Other Procurement, Navy
(OPN), dedicated MILCON such as Pollution Abatement, Cold
Iron, etc.
In actuality, nearly all of the screening occurred much
lower in the organizational structure. Once the AIS had
been compiled in the "smooth rough" by the Inspection Branch,
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copies were sent to all Cost Center Managers where those
projects which had already been done were lined out. Using
his subjective judgement, the Cost Center Manager then deter-
mined what work would be accomplished during the remainder
of the current fiscal year. This was subject only to the
constraint that total cost of work done throughout the year
coincided with anticipated overhead funds indicated on pre-
viously approved annual budget. The marked-up copies of the
AIS were returned to the Inspection Branch for consolida-
tion and smooth typing. All items not lined out, including
work Cost Center Managers plan to accomplish, were then
designated "A" for accrual and "B" for BMAR. The Planning
Officer normally signed out the smooth AIS "By direction."
This procedure did place the decision making at the
lowest responsible level of management in the PWC organi-
zation, but lack of definitive guidance to these managers
and confusion about the definition of BMAR had all but elim-
inated the intended screening process and conformance with
the desired criteria. This procedure also prevented activ-
ity-wide screening since each Cost Center Manager reviewed
the AIS independently. It resulted in deferrable work
being done in one cost center while another cost center
would accomplish only a small portion of identified critical
nondeferrable projects.
The lowest level of management which screened the AIS
should have functioned with "total knowledge of the current
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AIS/BMAR philosophy and Command policy. These managers
should not be permitted to screen independently. Some
coordinating body, most appropriately the Facilities Re-
view Board, had to ensure that overall PWC goals and objec-
tives were met and that the limited resources were applied
to the most critical deficiencies.
All activity major claimants were tasked with performing
a screening and validation function. For PWC San Diego,
NAVFAC as sub-major claimant performed initial screening-
for the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) , the Major Claimant.
Screening was done on the aggregated IC level. This insured
that emphasis was properly placed on the desired operational
areas, but unfortunately essential details were lost.
Combining all deficiencies by structure to obtain the $1000
minimum necessary to be included on the AIS masked the
nature of the individual deficiency. Further, it was im-
possible to expect the major claimant reviewer to have suf-
ficient detailed knowledge of each activity to know which
structure elements within the IC were mission essential and
which were not. The result was correct identification of
critical investment category, but concurrent approval of
nonessential deferrable work within the IC.
It was incumbant upon the PWC to conduct accurate
screening/validation in accordance with current criteria
prior to submission to the major claimant.
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F. PROBLEMS WITH BMAR ACCURACY
There are several additional factors which effected the
accuracy of the BMAR figure and are worthy of note. These
were more procedural in nature than the previously discussed
personnel problems associated with identification and
validation.
1 . Financial Controls
The Cost Center Manager "negotiated" his budget
with the Comptroller and the Budget Review Committee. The
actual mechanics of the budget formulation process are not
germane to this topic and are not addressed in detail. It
is important to know only that the cost center labor rates
included an overhead amount intended to fund maintenance
of PWC production facilities. The work funded through the
overhead portion of the production rates is termed "minor
maintenance" . Once the Cost Center Manager had an approved
budget, including estimated minor maintenance funds, he was
able to identify specific projects on the AIS which he
wanted to accomplish that fiscal year.
Review of the PWC San Diego Financial and Operating
(F & 0) Statement for 30 September 1978 indicated minimal
controls were placed on the actual spending in overhead
areas which effect BMAR. Detailed Cost Center Statements
for 500-Maintenance , 620-Utilities Operation, 690-Utilities
Communications and the Cost Center Summary are included in
APPENDIX K for illustration purposes. Maintenance and
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repair to buildings and maintenance and repair to grounds
are categories of overhead spending which have a direct
impact on BMAR.
The P & Statement showed all variances as the
percent of budgeted costs to actual costs. In the facili-
ties maintenance area, where the intent should have been to
spend at least what was budgeted, this had a tendency to
distort the true picture. Some specific examples of mainten-
ance and repair to buildings were as follows:
Cost Center Actual Cost Budgeted Cost % Variance
500 $99,370.42 $212,081.00 53
620 $ 1,995.60 $ 63,862.00 97
690 $ 735.87 $ 32,546.00 98
Summary $199,876.50 $479,569-00 58
The variance would have more impact if the figures
were reversed and stated in terms of actual cost divided by
budgeted cost. The PWC in total spent 42% of the amount
budgeted for maintenance and repair.
The variances were caused by many factors ; the most
important two were Cost Center Manager discretion to spend
as desired and PWC-wide dedicated programs which tapped
maintenance funds. These dedicated programs are discussed
in Section VI. The variance for PWC San Diego in the total
budget was only - 4%, which meant the Center actually spent
more than was budgeted, or incurred an operating loss. Since
the small total variance implied the Center came close to
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budget, the conclusion could be drawn that maintenance
spending was discretionary. The Cost Center Manager must
have some latitude within the budget, but in the critical
area of facilities maintenance there should have been clear
guidance to prevent excessive diversion of funds.
PWC San Diego had initiated a Shop Improvement
Program (SIP) to consolidate and improve production facili-
ties. This will be discussed in more detail in a later
section. It is noted here as an example of a PWC dedicated
program which diverted some of the maintenance funds.
The AIS and ultimately the BMAR were reduced by
the projects the Cost Center Managers accomplished during
the fiscal year. Diverting funds results in maintenance
work not done and the BMAR growing larger than planned.
This understatement will not be corrected until the facility
is reinspected and reported on the AIS.
2. Duplication of Effort
There was a tremendous amount of uncoordinated in-
spection of facilities taking place in the Naval Shore
Establishment. Many of the unrelated inspection programs
had some impact on the accuracy of the reported BMAP figure.
There was considerable duplication of effort which represented
an inefficient use of limited resources. Some of this effort
should have been expended to improve the NFA data base
problems discussed in Section V-C.
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There were three routine inspections conducted on
a regular basis for separate purposes. These were the
facilities maintenance inspections performed in accordance
with the MO-322 and OPNAVINST 11010.3^ which resulted in
the AIS; the Engineering Evaluation (EE) of existing assets
performed in accordance with the Navy Facilities Assets (NFA)
Data Base Manual, NAVFAC P-78; and the real property inven-
tory required by the NAVCOMP Manual.
In addition, there were one time directed programs
intended to highlight specific areas which required some-
what unique or specialized inspections. These most often
were generated by public interest on a national level. Ex-
amples included inspections to insure facilities met seismic
design standards for earthquake protection, inspections for
energy conservation in both consumption and radiation, and
safety inspections to comply with new regulations such as
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
.
It was the specific inspections which resulted in
errors in the reported BMAR. For example, the activity
inspector could conduct a routine inspection one month
and find no significant deficiencies, the next month a
thorough seismic or safety inspection could be done which
would reveal numerous non-deferrable deficiencies. Con-
siderable time elapsed before this latter information was
known to anyone who had the knowledge or authority to include
it in a BMAR listing.
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Each inspection was performed under a different
schedule by different people and with no apparent attempt
at joint utilization of limited resources or cross-check-
ing of information. Central coordination of the inspection
programs would have resulted in better utilization of
personnel. A thorough review of what each inspection was
intended to accomplish would have also provided a listing
of common data elements for multiple checks of the FASCO
NFA data base.
3. Deficiencies Not Shown on BMAR
The most significant errors in the PWC San Diego
reported BMAR were in programmed and unprogrammed MILCON
projects. Once an uncorrected facility deficiency project
was assigned a MILCON "P number" and had been included in
the 5 year MILCON program, it was considered programmed and
was supposed to be reported separately in the AIS ^Ref . l/
.
PWC San Diego recognized programmed projects, but continued
to report them as BMAR. Reference 1 also excluded report-
ing of any unprogrammed MILCON projects. PWC San Diego
reported these projects as BMAR in the AIS.
Historically, programmed utility projects had a very
poor chance of being funded by Congress. Additionally, non-
deferrable unprogrammed projects were excluded from any re-
porting mechanism. This situation resulted in severely
deteriorated mission essential utility systems, which re-
quired large sums of maintenance money and labor effort to
maintain, never being included in a BMAR figure.
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4. Economic Reality Distorts BMAR
The U.S. Government did not practice "life cycle"
costing for its facilities nor did it depreciate its assets.
The PWC F & Statement did provide a depreciation figure
but this was for record purposes only. The MILCON appro-
priation system used in 1978 provided no rational means of
replacing a facility when it had reached the end of its
economic or useful life. Such a system would have destroyed
any private enterprise, which must plan its facility re-
quirements well in advance of need. Since this was not
done in the Navy, this meant facilities had to be maintained
as though they would be kept forever. This forced the facil-
ities manager to make decisions about maintenance which he
knows are uneconomical. Life cycle costing was required
by Reference 13
.
The PWC, for both its own facilities and those of
its customer activities, routinely expended maintenance
funds on facilities which had long passed their economic
lives and should have been replaced. BMAR would have been
lower if facilities had been replaced as detailed by
sound economics.
In the total life of the average Navy facility, the
excessive maintenance funds spent after a structure passed
its economic life would probably have totaled more than its
replacement cost. This would be an interesting area for
further research study. One approach could be to use Public
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Utility standards for facility replacement, apply this to
FWC systems, then total annual maintenance costs accrued
subsequent to the "normal" replacement date.
G. TWC SAN DIEGO UTILITY SYSTEM BMAR
The Utilities Department, Cost Center 600, at FWC San
Diego had 97-35% of the identified BMAR for that activity
in 1978. This did not include a significant number of pro-
grammed utility MILCON projects. The utilities backlog
at San Diego was the largest of any reported by the other
seven PWC's. Its magnitude appeared to be the result of
the facilities management philosophy employed and the ap-
proach used in identification of deficiencies.
1 . Utility Maintenance Philosophy
The Utilities personnel knew there was a signifi-
cant problem with maintenance of the systems. Almost con-
tinuous repair problems could have conceivably kept the
planning effort at the breakdown maintenance level with all
work going into the day to day operations. However, there
was a concentrated management effort to avoid this and
develop a sound master plan in 1977 for all San Diego area
FWC utilities. This effort involved four basic steps:
(1) Determine what the systems actually are and where
they are located.
(2) Determine the condition of the existing utility
systems
.




(4) Develop a long range master plan for repair and
replacement based on current conditions and an-
ticipated future requirements.
Steps 1, 2, and 3 were relatively complete, within
available resources, and the master plan was being develop-
ed in 1978. Any projects associated with the utility sys-
tems, including inspections, MILCON, and accrual projects
were develped in consanance with the master plan philosophy,
but were not kept -in strict accordance with the BMAR cri-
teria of nondeferrability.
There was a fifth step which lacked clear definition
but could have been called midrange planning. This con-
cerned the funding sources more than project planning or
preparation. There was a conscious attempt to ascertain
the most likely and quickest funding source for each project
and pursue that even if it was not the most appropriate.
For example, a project would be submitted for accomplishment
using accrual funds, even though it could be done using the
MILCON route, since obtaining accrual funds was easier and
more assured. Some projects, lacking a high priority in the
master plan, would be submitted for MILCON funding when
accruals would also be appropriate, because the method
would save customer activity O&MN funds.
Another sound managment approach taken for correction
of utilities systems deficiencies was to load as much util-
ity improvement work as possible into a MILCON project. It
was a rational approach to plan for any new facility to
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carry its total utility requirements, including all repair
and replacement work outside the immediate project boundary
but necessary to insure a reliable source. A strong argu-
ment was also made for sizing utilities in one project to
meet known future requirements
.
All required maintenance work was also done in
consonence with the master plan concept. Systems were up-
graded whenever possible to increase capacity in antici-
pation of increased demand or to meet changes in technology.
Changes in type and quantity of electricity, steam, air and
water for new classes of ships being developed were a man-
datory consideration in the planning process where replace-
ment work was necessary.
Both MI1C0N programs and maintenance work placed
strong emphasis on system integrity and reliability.
Electrical grids and steam, water and air system loops
were closed whenever possible. This would permit back-
feeding of utility services and eliminate what otherwise
could have been major outages. Work in this area was sen-
sitive since it often involved new installations which could
neither be considered repair or part of a new facility, yet
it was good management practice to accomplish it.
2. Engineering Evaluation VS Engineered Estimates
Most of the utility systems for which PWC San Diego
had responsibility were constructed during World War II or
earlier and were underground, in direct burial or covered
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trenches. This made actual visual inspection for condition
exceedingly difficult and expensive. Specialized inspection
techniques being developed at the Civil Engineering Labora-
tory under OP-44 direction in 1978 were expected to greatly
improve the situation, but engineering evaluations were
made in lieu of actual inspections until the new techniques
were available. The obvious exceptions to this were when
a system failed or when it was accessible. Engineering
evaluations considered age, location, usage, life expectancy,
type of materials, etc. in making a judgement or when the
system should be replaced. MILCON and accrual programs
were then developed and submitted based on these evaluations.
The Contractor Quality Control (CQC) Program intro-
duced into construction contracts in about 1972 hurt the
activities in the area of deficiency/facility condition
identification. CQC essentially made it a contractor
responsibility to insure construction was in accordance
with plans and specifications, and eliminated the need for
a government inspector full time on the project. There was
no requirement for the contractor or CQC representative
to notify the government concerning the location or con-
dition of existing utilities. As a result a contractor
could be engaged in underground utility installations and
uncover lines not shown on existing "as-built" drawings or
in very poor condition. The "time is money" economics of
the competitive construction industry would result in
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backfilling the area with no notification to the government.
In the past, the government inspector would record these
items and notify the activity. The only time the govern-
ment would he notified of an unusual condition was if it
caused a problem for the contractor for which a claim was
anticipated.
A clause in the CQC portion of construction contact
specifications which would have made it mandatory for con-
tractor notification to the government when conditions of
extreme deterioration or unknown/mislocated underground
utility lines were discovered would have improved the
utility maintenance program.
The maintenance philosophy and inspection tech-
niques used cannot be faulted since they followed good
management practices based on the realities of the sit-
uation. Unfortunately, they resulted in reporting dificien-
cies which did not meet the criteria for consideration as
BMAR. As such, the actual reportable nondeferrable utility
deficiencies were greatly overstated.
H. SUMMARY
The total BMAR figure for FWC San Diego was not very
accurate. The definition of what should be considered
BMAR was interpreted differently throughout the organization,
There was no uniform policy established for screening the
AIS to separate projects into deferrable and nondeferrable
7^

deficiencies. The results of the inspection effort which
generated the AIS were highly suspect. Personnel, untrained
in facilities inspection techniques, were detailed from the
production shops to assist the Inspection Branch. Question-
able field estimates made by these personnel were used in the
AIS and determined the dollar magnitude of the reported
deficiencies. Indexing old inspection estimates to bring
values up to the current reporting date ignored the likli-
hood of considerable deterioration of facilities since the
original inspection. The duplication of effort for routine
and specialized inspections introduced further confusion
and conflicts in reported figures.
Adding to the errors in reporting was the lack of
financial controls placed on spending for maintenance once
the cost center budgets had been prepared and approved. The
lack of control resulted in maintenance work not being
accomplished and a larger BMAR existing than was reported.
Backlog reporting for utility systems was based almost
entirely on engineering evaluations of the systems vice
actual inspections. Cost estimates for this work were
similarly based upon engineering judgements of facility
condition. The procedure resulted in many projects being
included in the AIS and MILCON program which were really
deferrable in current fiscal year, even though they did
represent good facilities maintenance management.
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The factors which contribute to the inaccuracies in
reported AIS/BMAR estimates were both additive and deduc-
tive in nature. However, the errors inherent in the utili-
ties system maintenance philosophy were principally additive.
Since this constituted over 97$ of the total reported BM/LR,
it led to the conclusion that BMAR was overstated by a
significant amount. Strict adherence to the CNO requirements




VI. HOW TO REDUCE BMAR
Previous sections of this thesis have shown that the
validity of the 1978 reported figure for PWC San Diego
BMAR is not only questionable, hut grossly overstated. This
overstatement was due primarily to the inclusion of valid
deficiencies which did not fit within the rigid DOD defin-
ition of BMAR. Any program to reduce BMAR must have a
reasonably valid total as a starting point. Since a reason-
ably valid total was not available, the problem of how to
reduce BMAR had to be dealt with in general terms.
BMAR was measured in dollars and was reduced by the
application of dollars. Decisions had to be made as to
what source of funds should be utilized, what projects to
accomplish in what order, and what length of time should be
targeted for the total reduction of BMAR. There were
basically two sources of funds; those generated internal to
the Navy Industrial Fund, and those available from external
sources. The use of either of these sources for BMAR
reduction had both advantages and disadvantages.
A. INTERNAL SOLUTIONS
Almost all income of a Navy Industrial Fund activity
was generated by the rates paid by its customers. Large
projects were accomplished by accrual, the process whereby
a specific portion of the rates was set aside to fund a
specific project. Smaller projects were accomplished
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within a cost center's overhead budget. The total size
of the overhead budget was determined when the rates were
established. Increases in the funds available from either
of these sources can be accomplished by 1) increasing
volume, 2) decreasing other costs (ie. increasing produc-




A Public Works Center did not control its volume,
its customers did. It worked with its customers to accurate-
ly project volume during the budget process, and the pro-
jected volume was used to establish the center's rates and
support the customer's O&MN budget request. Large varia-
tions between projected and actual volume caused many prob-
lems for both the center and its customers. Deliberately
seeking a variance from projected volume was therefore not





At any given stabalized rate level, increased funds
for maintenance can be generated by increasing productivity.
The extent to which productivity increases can provide funds
for maintenance and eventually result in lower rates is a
subject worthy of further research that is beyond the




The rates charged by a NIF activity should include
sufficient funds to maintain the assets employed to provide
the services for which those rates are charged. Theoretical-
ly, if a backlog existed due to lack of funds, then previous
rates or actual maintenance expenditures, had been too low.
Increasing maintenance expenditures to a level at which no
growth of BMAR occurs is consistent with the NIF concept of
giving visibility to the full cost of services received.
This should be done no matter what else is done. Increase
above this level to reduce BMAR would result in a temporary
and artificial overstatement of full cost. Concern existed
as to whether future customers should bear the burden
created by undercharges to past customers.
B. EXTERNAL SOLUTIONS
The provision of external funds to maintain NIF assets
was not in keeping with the revolving fund concept while
provision of external funds to replace assets was part of
that concept. Given the age of most of FWC San Diego's util-
ity systems, the division between repair and replacement
was by no means clear. Considering this lack of clarity,
the magnitude of the backlog and the lengthy period over
which the backlog had grown, a one time infusion of external
funds may have been the most reasonable and equitable solu-
tion to the problem. Some concern existed however that
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having once reduced the backlog with external funds , a pre-
cedent would have been established and some incentives
provided to allow the problem to grow again in the future.
1. MILCON or O&MN?
The two types of external funds available were
theoretically for different purposes, O&MN for maintenance
and repair and MILCON for replacement. There were, of
course, projects which clearly fit into one category or
the other. There was also a large middle ground of repair
by replacement where either fund source could have been
considered appropriate. Given the historical lack of
responsiveness of MILCON appropriations for utilities pro-
jects , it was only natural for managers to define require-
ments in terms of O&MN funding. If this was considered to
be an inappropriate approach, it was incumbent upon the
Navy's top managers to work to improve the responsiveness
of the MILCON system. This would have reduced project
manipulation within the gray area.
2. Unique External Solutions
FWC San Diego was able to identify and implement
unique solutions to specific BMAR problems. The Center
was faced with aging boilers used for steam production.
The Center purchased its electricity from San Diego Gas and
Electric SDG&E. The Center was able to negotiate a con-
tract whereby SDG&E constructed a gas turbine electrical
generating plant on the Naval Station. This plant was
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used to generate the electricity the Center needed to
purchase and the waste heat from the plant was converted
to steam which was also sold to the Center. Even allowing
for recovery on SDG&E capital expenditures , steam was pur-
chased at a rate cheaper than the Center's costs for pro-
ducing steam using its deteriorating plants. This approach
is unique both in its overall increased efficiency in the
use of energy and in the approach of correcting a BMAR
deficiency by removing the need for the facility containing
the deficiency.
PWC San Diego also had an active program of Master
Planning for future utility needs of its customers MILCON
projects. These projects often coincidently corrected or
eliminated BMAR deficiencies (ie. when a pier was replaced,
new utility lines were provided to meet the requirements
of the modern ships that would use the pier)
.
These reductions in BMAR were truly serendipitous
and difficult to predict, however the reductions were
significant and well worth pursuing whenever the opportunity
arose.
C. TIME SCHEDULE FOR SOLUTION
Discussion at NAVFAC and OP-44 in 1978 was in terms of
a five year program to reduce BMAR to zero. This time
period was based on balancing a desire to accomplish reduc-
tion in the shortest time possible and a subjective judgement
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of the maximum temporary annual increase the appropriation
system was likely to tolerate. Research at San Diego re-
vealed that certain physical restraints dictated a longer
period. PWC San Diego Utility managers felt that "...a
BMAR reduction program could not "be executed in less than
10 years because of the need to minimize disruption of on-
going utility and other station operations and to effective-
ly coordinate the work with other MILCON programming for
expansion, alteration, and modernization" /Ref. 16/ . This
statement, that the reported BMAR could not be accomplished
in one or even five years even if funding was avilable was
in contradicition with the definition of BMAR which states
that these nondeferrable projects are only deferred because
"...lack of resources prohibits accomplishment in that
fiscal year" /Ref. I/7 , it was possible, however, that a
list of projects, each one valid in its own right and de-
ferred only due to lack of funds when considered individ-
ually, must be accomplished over a much longer time span
due to the aggregate disruption that would be generated by
accomplishing them all at once. This is important in that
I
it shows that the establishment of a timetable for reduction
of BMAR is more than a budgetary problem. Any schedule
for BMAR reduction proposed by budgeteers must include
consideration of the interaction and disruptive effects of




The widespread lack of understanding of the definition
of BMAR resuted in projects suitable for accomplishment by
MILCON being included in BMAR at PWC San Diego. This led
to the impression that MILCON funds were appropriate for
reduction of part of BMAR. By definition, MILCON projects
are not included in BMAR. The application of the proper
definition of BMAR, while not physically accomplishing any
projects, will reduce reported BMAR to true BMAR, MILCON
funds would no longer provide reduction other than the
occassional serendipitous effect.
Accordingly, there are only two choices of fund source
possible; a one time infusion of O&MN funds provided by
the PWC's major claimant or an increase in rates chared
customers. Rates paid by customers also come from the
O&MN appropriation so the only choice to be made is what
path the O&MN funds should take. Routing funds through the
PWC's customers though more consistent with the NIF con-
cept is a lengthier, more uncertain funding chain. O&MN
funds are utilized for many things besides maintenance and
repair, and it is the low priority placed on maintenance and
repair by operational managers that promoted BMAR growth
in the first place. Consequently, there would be no guaran-
tee that all additional O&MN funds appropriated specifically
for BMAR reduction at NIF activities would make their way
to that end. It is therefore recommended that since a
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specific portion of the O&MN appropriation must be justified
for this purpose, funds should be provided directly to the
end user (in this case, PWC San Diego) and "fenced" to
insure utilization for the intended purpose.
Once a reasonably valid total for BMAR is established,
a specific schedule for reduction that considers both budget
climate and physical constraints can be established.
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VII . CONTROL OF BMAR GROWTH
A. COST OF OWNERSHIP
1. Concept
Adequate facilities maintenance requires planning
and funding in two separate and distinct areas. The first
consideration is that of reducing the current BMAR to an
acceptable level so that all identified nondeferrable defic-
iencies are corrected. This aspect was addressed in
Section VI. The second part of the program concerns pre-
vention of future growth of BMAR. This is directly related
to the concept of minimum cost of ownership.
In general terms the "minimum" cost may be consid-
ered to be the amount of funding necessary to offset the
routine maintenance requirements of active facilities. "Cost
of ownership" will exist regardless of past funding levels
or current condition of plant. The "minimum cost of owner-
ship" should be the steady state maintenance funding re-
quirements determined after the BMAR has been reduced to
zero. Funding trends below this level result in consumption
of plant assets and an accumulation of a nondeferrable
maintenance backlog.
2. Cost of Ownership and Current Plant Value
OP-44 was interested in developing a rational macro-
level approach to funding the minimum cost of ownership
of active Navy facilities. The method selected was an ex-
pression of annual maintenance funding required as a
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percentage of Current Plant Value (CPV) . Working with
limited data, a linear regression analysis approach was
used to identify this relationship. The analysis showed
that, on the average for all 18 ICs, the Navy must spend
1.2$ of the CPV of its real property each year to provide
adequate maintenance.
Current Plant Value (CPV) is a computer generated
dollar estimate of today's cost to construct a facility
that is physically equivilant to a facility in inventory (ie
the same design, configuration, materials, building tech-
nology, etc.); it is the expected cost to replace in kind .
How CPV is computed has a direct bearing on the magnitude
of the percentage figure used to determine annual mainten-
ance funding requirements. It is important to note the
accuracy of CPV will have no effect on the dollars actually
required, only upon the stated percentage figure.
The CPV of Class II facilities in the Navy's inven-
tory was estimated using a set of cost escalation multi-
pliers which were computed annually based upon averages
obtained from the Marshall and Stephens Indices of Building
Cost Factors. A set of multipliers existed for each of the
construction types: permanent, semipermanent, and tempo-
rary. The CPV does not necessarily indicate the amount
that the government would have to pay today to acquire a
building of the same size to perform the same function,
since facilities such as standards and criteria, building
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materials and technology, etc., change over time. A
measure of the cost to construct a functional equivalent
of an existing facility is useful for planning for reloca-
tion or in repair vs. replacement decisions. This measure
is defined as the replacement cost and is not considered
herein.
The CPV of Class II facilities is an estimate re-
quired in reports from the Naval Facilities Assets Data
Base for maintenance funding management purposes, is re-
ported in the annual P-164, Detailed Inventory of Naval
Shore Facilities , and is summarized in P-319> Statistical
Tables of Military Real Property . Since Naval facilities
range in age over two centuries, inflation precludes the
use of acquisition costs as a measure of value.
Due to the importance attached to CPV, NAVFAC
commissioned a study to look into the validity of using
the Marshall and Stephens Index. The study found relative-
ly small variations between multipliers derived from various
indices, and recommended that the Marshall-Stephens multi-
pliers be continued in use for computation of CPV /Ref . lij
•
It was further pointed out in the study that the use
of any cost index to compute CPV over a large number of
years is an inherently error-prone procedure. The error
in CPV was further compounded in the approach taken by the
Navy to obtain the basic cost figure to which the multipliers
is applied. This cost figure was defined as the total of
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the acquisition cost plus all of the capital improvement
costs. This total was then escalated from the acquisition
year. Thus, the older the facility and the more capital
improvements which have been accomplished the greater will
"be the upward bias of the CPV computation. The net result
was probably a greatly overvalued CPV total.
1.2$ of CPV had been determined to be the figure
which will generate sufficient funds to insure that Naval
Shore establishment is maintained in a steady state, or
zero BMAR growth, condition. The danger of having a
grossly overstated CPV is that if it is reduced to a correct
lower value, the applied percentage figure would have to
be much higher to generate the same level of maintenance
funding. Increasing the percent of CPV figure could create
problems in the Congressional appropriation chain even
though the dollar amount remained the same. People become
accustomed to thinking in terms of some percent of a figure
rather than in terms of dollars
.
3. Industry Maintenance Practices
Facilities maintenance practices in private industry
proved to be very infertile ground in researching the cost
of ownership concept. Consequently, very little research
effort was expended in this area.
Industry maintenance funding was predicted upon
historical spending data and current year profit positions.
If the amount spent on maintenance the previous year seemed
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about right, this figure was used as a base for the current
year and then escalated for inflation. Maintenance for any
additions to plant facilities or capital investments were
computed at the same unit rate (ie. dollar rate per square
foot of new facility)
.
This philosophy was heavily influenced by the eco-
nomic realities of the competitive business world. In-
dustry maintenance management objectives were preceived to
be the protection of the company's capital investment and to
increase profits. Maintenance of safety standards was in-
terwoven into these two objectives. However, the amounts
actually spent for maintenance were dependent upon the
financial position of the company for the previous year.
When profits are declining maintenance work is deferred,
starting with non-production assets.
Maintenance funding based upon cost of ownership
as a percent of replacement value was not being used in
any of the four firms questioned.
h. California State College and University Maintenance
Programs
Many large university and college campuses in
California have facilities similar to those found on an
average Naval installation. It was anticipated that main-
tenance management problems might also be very similar.
Research was undertaken to determine how some of these in-
stitutions of higher learning identified maintenance
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deficiencies and justified funding requests. It would be
of particular interest to know whether or not maintenance
funding requirements were identified as a percent of CPV or
whether there was a deliberate process to determine the
cost of ownership.
A representative from the office of Associate Vice
President for Administration at California State College
Sacramento was contacted concerning their maintenance
program ^/Ref . 187. It was learned that the college had no
planned inspection program and used neither depreciation or
life cycle costing for facility replacement. Two fund
sources were avilable from the State Legislature, one being
Capital Outlay used for acquiring new assets or replacement
of old facilities, and the second an Operating Budget for
routine operation and maintenance of the campus. There
was direct and open competition among the California State
Colleges for these funds. The larger maintenance and re-
pair projects were submitted to the Legislature only when
requested. Funds for replacement of facilities beyond their
economic life were requested from the Legislature as the
need arose. There had been no attempt to study the cost of
ownership for the campus nor was any planned.
Personnel from the Deferred Maintenance Department
at the University of California Berkley campus were inter-
viewed on the same subject. This facility had a formal in-
spection program using a manual card system for scheduling.
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Any identified deficiency which could not he corrected in
the year discovered was carried as a backlog. Operation and
maintenance funds were budgeted and requested on the basis
of the total square footage of structures on the campus.
No life cycle costing for facility replacement was attempted
and no cost of ownership was computed. The University did
use CPV as computed by the insurance carrier, but it had
no connection with maintenance.
Perhaps the most sophisticated facilities mainten-
ance management program was being followed at the University
of California at San Diego (UCSD) ^Ref . 1£7. Personnel in
the Maintenance Department had conducted an exhaustive
study on work elements to demonstrate the need for more
funds. A computerized utilities monitoring system having
limited off-line batch processing capability was useful in
the study. Unfortunately little came of the effort as
funding for all California State Universities continued to
be allocated on the basis of facility squre footages , re-
gardless of use. UCSD deliberately retained as large a
backlog of identified deficiencies as possible to justify
funding requests in the competitive system. This was per-
ceived as the only way to insure getting an equitable share
of the available money.
The campus used a rather unique approach to routine
day-to-day maintenance. Sixty percent of the annual budget
was retained for work considered essential by the facilities
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manager and forty percent was placed into a quasi "checking
account" for each department. From this forty percent
the departments paid for requested maintenance. There was
no formal facilities inspection program; the Maintenance
Department responded to individual requests from other
university departments. The university still had its
maintenance backlog, hut the department personnel were
happier because they could get the work done they felt
was most important. Competition for funds state-wide
obviates the usefulness of cost ownership consideration.
5. State of Texas Formula
The Texas College and University System was the only
instititional complex found which utilized a cost of owner-
ship methodology in facilities maintenance planning. An-
nual budget estimates were obtained using facilities
replacement cost times a maintenance cost factor.
The Texas College and University System facilities
are much newer than those found in the Naval Shore Estab-
lishment. For this reason, replacement cost is a better
maintenance indicator than current plant value used by the
Navy. The method of computing replacement costs was similar
to that used by the Navy in determining CPV. All capital
investment costs were added to the original construction
cost and the figure was escalated to current dollars. The
Navy used the Marshall-Stevens Index in obtaining CPV and
the Texas system used the copyrighted Markel's Handy
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Appraisal Chart. The Markel Chart considered age, geographic
location, and type of construction in determining basic
building construction costs. The chart was updated every
six months.
Maintenance funding requirements were then found
by multiplying the replacement cost by a maintenance cost
factor. Percentage factors for the 1979 to 1981 Biennium
were as follows
:
Wood-frame Masonary-Wood Mas onary- Concrete
Construction Construction Construction
Air
Conditioned 1.90 1.^5 1-25
Non-Air
Conditioned 1.75 1-30 1.10
Cost factors were determined by the Coordinating
Board, Texas College and University System, which was ap-
pointed by the State Governor. Cost factors were provided
for building maintenance, grounds maintenance and custodial
services (APPENDIX L) . Factors were reviewed by the Coordin-
ating Board every two years and updated as necessary.
The average factor for all types of non-aircondi-
tioned structures was 1.38% in the Texas System which
compared closely to the 1.2$ used by the Navy. However,
since CPV for the Navy was 5^967 billion dollars, this
.18$ difference would amount to 98.94 million dollars per
year in maintenance funds. Every tenth of a percent error
in the cost factor applied to a CPV of 5^,967 million
dollars will be 5^.967 million dollars in maintenance.
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Such an error becomes even more significant when consider-
ing the total MRP funding for FY 1977 was 296.6 million
dollars on a Congressional floor of 2^3 million dollars.
6. Maintenance Economics - Life Cycle Costing
Today's facilities maintenance managers are forced
by the "system" to make uneconomical decisions concerning
expenditure of funds. Any facility or utility system has
an expected economic and physical life. Utilization of
economic life is important in a private enterprise system
for life cycle costing maintenance, repair and replacement,
but it was not being used by the Navy. Facilities are
rarely if ever replaced when they should be because of
the MILCON programming and funding procedures. As a result,
the prudent manager must extend the useful life of a facil-
ity or utility system to the point of considering it will
have to almost last indefinitely. This rationale causes
the manager to spend more on maintenance than sound econom-
ics would justify.
The PWC, as a NIF activity, was intended to be
run on a business-like basis. Businesses make repair vs.
replace decisions with an economic analysis of the life
cycle costs of both alternatives playing a major, and often
dominate, role in the decision process. Regardless of
whether economic analysis, profit position, or other strate-
gic consideration governs the decision, all are considered
by a single executive, manager, board, or committee. In the
9^

Navy, the ultimate decision on major projects rests with one
of two congressional sub-committees, the one for O&MN funds
which in effect decides repair or don't repair, and the one
for MILCON which decides replace or don't replace. It
should be noted that it is possible and not uncommon for
this process to result in decisions to either repair or
replace. The Navy managers who define the appropriate
action by requesting either repair or replacement funds are
responsible for considering life cycle costs and choosing
the most economical approach. Appropriation politics and
the realities of the budget process often require practical
managers to choose the path most likely to be successful
whether or not it is most economical. As a result, life
cycle costs, if they are considered at all, are often not
the dominant consideration in repair vs. replace decisions.
It would be naive to expect bottom up input to
result in a change to congressional committee structure.
The pressures on congressmen are such that an expense de-
ferred is viewed as an expense saved even if the net impact
is uneconomical on a life cycle basis. Refusal to replace
when economical increases the requirement for repair funds.
Underfunding replacement can result in a brand new facility
that is more costly to maintain and is uneconomical on a
life cycle basis. Underfunding repair will shorten the
economic life of a facility and require replacement at an
earlier date. It is a vicious circle and until the funding
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decisions are made in a coordinated manner by a single
body, such inefficiency will continue.
The establishment of NIF activities made business-
like control of the level of repair feasable. Assigning
PWC's an equal level of responsibility and authority for
utility replacement decisions will provide the second half
of the process necessary for sensible and economic operation
of utility systems.
7. What is the Real Cost of Ownership?
At this juncture, it becomes necessary to take a
somewhat philisophical approach to control of BMAR growth
through adequate funding of the day-to-day routine mainten-
ance- This was necessary because sound, factual minimum
costs of ownership figures do not exist. The figure of 1.2$
of CPV used by OP-44 will suffice as an extreme macro-level
approach to maintenance funding, but it breaks down badly
when carried to the micro or activity level.
The Public Works Centers have no idea of v/hat the
true minimum costs of ownership is. Ture figures are dis-
torted by an excessive BMAR and the absence of valid
actual annual maintenance costs. Inaccuracies in CPV serve
to further confuse the cost of ownership computations.
Purification of CPV is a topic beyond the scope of
this thesis. The Facility Inspection System will be use-
ful in improving accuracy of the basic elements in the
Naval Facilities Asset data base and this will correct
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many CPV errors. However, one recommendation worthy of
further study would be the abandonment of CPV in favor of
replacement cost. Replacement costs are much easier to
obtain since they involve functionally identical facilities.
The applied percentage factors used to convert this figure
to maintenance dollars may change but the actual magnitude
for any given year would remain constant.
The problems associated with BMAR validation and
liquidation were addressed in earlier sections of this
thesis. For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed
that at some point in the future, the AIS will receive
proper screening to identify true BMAR and a program
initiated which will ultimately lead to its elimination.
When this point is reached, an accurate minimum cost of
ownership figure will still not be obtainable unless ad-
ditional changes have been made in the current system.
Actual maintenance requirements , both deferrable
and non-deferrable, must be known and the cost estimates
for each work element must be compared with actual expen-
ditures. As a starting point, inspections and estimate
preparation must be accomplished by qualified personnel.
This means establishment of a comprehensive training
program for PWC Inspection Branch personnel, or contracting
the work out to a qualified civilian firm.
The use of Engineered Performance Standards (EPS)
must be mandatory in preparation of estimates. EPS, developed
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in the late 1950' s and early 1960's, were in large part
responsible for dramatic increases in facilities mainten-
ance productivity in the Navy Public Works Maintenace
Management System. EPS were the building blocks utilized
to formulate labor estimates for maintenance work. They
have been allowed to deteriorate over the past decade and
become essentially obsolete. EPS could be uniformly ap-
plied Navy-wide and would provide a standard of performance
against which the actual cost of maintenance might be com-
pared. To be effective, EPS must: (1) be constantly re-
viewed and updated to reflect new methods, new materials,
new technology and other developments that affect standards
;
and (2) have their use in the field by trained personnel
monitored to assure compliance with the EPS and their proper
use. Resurrection of EPS or some other uniform standard
is considered an essential step in providing the true
cost of annual maintenance. Collection of this data for
a period of years may then be compared to CPV, or some
other plant value indicator, to produce an accurate minimum
cost of ownership figure. This data must be broken down
by investment category as such information is necessary to
funding de c i s i ons
.
B. BMAR GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES
1
.
Assumptions Necessary to Proposed Recommendations
Actual value for the minimum cost of ownership
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including a breakdown by investment category, did not exist
for PWC San Diego at the time research for this thesis
was conducted, and their derivation was impossible within
resources available to the authors. The following discus-
sion is based on the assumption that these figures will be
available at some reasonable time in the future. This
assumption was necessary in order to provide a starting
point from which to logically develop the discussion into
a proposed workable solution.
Not knowing with some degree of precision what the
actual cost of ownership was also made it impossible to
recommend a single solution which would categorically pro-
vide the necessary funds. Therefore, it is assumed that
once the BMAR is reduced to zero, the minimum cost of owner-
ship will be less than the total maintenance funds which
can be generated from the NIP stabilized rate structure.
Stated another way, money generated through the production
overhead and utility rates will be sufficient to fund the
routine day-to-day maintenance requirements.
It was also necessary to clarify the definition of
minimum cost of ownership. This was assumed to be the
routine daily maintenance requirements of any Naval shore
activity where the manager functions as if facilities will
have to be retained well beyond their economic life. This
annual figure would be lower if life cycle costing was




funds. It would be higher if both maintenance and replace-
ment costs were to be recovered through the rate structure
and both were considered cost of ownership.
PWC San Diego proposed a cost of ownership figure
of 2 percent of Current Plant Replacement Value (CPRV)
^/Ref. 16/. This 2 percent equates to an estimated 8 mil-
lion dollars annually. Historically, 1.3 million dollars
was being spent for day-to-day maintenance. The remaining
6.7 million dollars would be used for repair, replacement
and modernization work for both short and long term projects
This was a reasonable maintenance management approach,
however, it departed from the accepted OP-44 concept of
minimum cost of ownership. The proposed program contained
elements necessary to correct deficiencies which clearly
required construction.
For purposes of this thesis, only maintenance require-
ments were considered to constitute the minimum cost of
ownership. Major replacements and construction projects
would be funded through the MILCON program. Using this
philosophy it was assumed adequate funds would be avail-
able through the stabalized rates to prevent a recurrance
in BMAR growth using the OP-44 1.2% of CPV figure.
2. Sources of Routine Maintenance Funds
There were three potential fund sources available
to pay for PWC San Diego maintenance; O&MN, minor mainten-
ance and major maintenance. Supplemental O&MN funding as
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a long term solution to cost of ownership was not consid-
ered a viable source as this would tend to abrogate the
NIF concept of self-sufficiency.
Minor maintenance funds were defined as money gen-
erated from an overhead factor applied to all direct labor
hours associated with production activities. These funds
were utilized for routine maintenance of PWC production
assets and were programmed for use in the Shop Improvement
Program. The rate structure appeared more than adequate
to fund the cost of ownership associated with production
facilities.
The most significant source of funding was termed
the major maintenance and accrual program. This program
absorbed over 90?6 of the total PWC San Diego maintenance
funds. Major maintenance and accruals were considered to
be that work paid for with funds obtained by applying an
overhead factor to all utility rates. The table on the
following page shows that portion of the stabilized rate
which was being applied to major maintenance in FY 1979
and estimates for FY 1980.
3- Maintenance Control Methods
Establishment of control mechanisms was considered
absolutely essential to the success of a PWC facilities
maintenance management program which will prevent BMAR














































Funds Generated 2.5 million 3.2 million
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Any maintenance program must have a central manager
to assure objectives are accomplished efectively and ef-
ficiently. For a non-PWC activity, this is the respon-
sibility of the Public Works Officer (PWO). This single
individual, operating with sound understanding of facility
condition and knowledge of command objectives, makes the
decisions on how and where to obligate maintenance funds.
Who is the PWO at a Public Works Center? At PWC
San Diego, there was no single individual with responsi-
bility for maintenance management of all PWC assets. Each
Cost Center Manager, acting independently, was managing his
own mini-maintenance program. This system prohibited ap-
plication of any center-wide maintenance program and re-
sulted in excessive discreationary underspending of budgeted
maintenance funds. One officer or senior civilian must be
given the responsibility and authority to conduct a PWC-
wide maintenance program.
This individual would be responsible for the AIS
including generation, validation and submission. He would
also be responsible for monitoring the maintenance program
to insure all budgeted resources are expended in the proper
area. Under the new PWC organization, the most logical
officer to be assigned this responsibility would be the
Planning Officer. At PWC San Diego, the Planning Officer
was already responsible for the AIS and his responsibilities
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required sufficient knowledge and experience to manage
a maintenance program.
To function efficiently, the PWC maintenance man-
ager must have financial control over the budgeted funds
.
Under the system which existed at PWC San Diego, there
were no controls. Cost Center Managers had discretionary
authority over maintenance funds, the command could with-
draw cost center funds for specific designated programs,
such as Shop Improvement Program (SIP) , and accruals could
be manipulated. The approved operating budget, consisting
both of planned expenses and expected outputs, is the guide-
line for operations. Presumably, management wants the
organization to operate in a way that is consistent with
this plan, unless there is a good reason to depart from it.
Accrual manipulation represented a significant po-
tential dollar magnitude of discretionary spending. The
Navy Industrial Fund Handbook for Public Works Centers,
NAVSO P-1718, provided explicit guidance on accruals for
major maintenance, repairs and alterations /para. 9212
Ref. 207. Major maintenance, repair and alterations were
defined as those projects undertaken periodically to re-
store or maintain plant, equipment and real property of the
Public Works Centers to such a condition that they may be
efficiently utilized for their designated purpose. Projects
had to be accomplished as a single undertaking for which
the costs would be incurred in a relatively short period,
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whereas the "benefits may "be spread over several years.
Projects estimated to exceed $25,000 and planned for ac-
complishment during the ensuing fiscal year required sub-
mission to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command for
review and approval. The estimated cost of these projects
had to be accrued over a twelve month period in order to
facilitate customer workload planning.
However, the accrual program at PWC San Diego was
experiencing some difficulty. There were problems with
being able to execute all accrual projects once the money
was available. The principal cause of this situation was
a shortage of personnel necessary to design, award and
administer the contracts
There was also some manipulation of funds within
the program. The impact of any major unanticipated rate
increases by the utility companies was being offset by
simply stopping accruals in the specific area affected.
Money which would have gone to an accrual project went in-
stead to the local utility company. This practice was
employed rather than incurring an annual operating loss
or requesting an increase in the PWC Corpus. The activities
involved would suffer from lower quality utility service
due to deferred maintenance and BMAR would grow.
A single set of utility rates was established for
all PWC San Diego customers activities ^Ref . 2lJ7. This
meant that all activities receiving a utility service
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but having no accrual projects would pay for the accrual
projects at other activities. It was also necessary to
accrue money from one high volume utility rate in order to
obtain sufficient funds for accomplishment of a major pro-
ject in a low volume utility. Funds accrued in these ways
were not always being spent on the project for which they
were intended.
There is a delicate balance between the restrictions
that are desirable in order to curb imprudent spending, and
the restrictions that are undesirable because they unduly
curb the Cost Center's Managers' ability to make decisions
on how 'to best use available resources. However, at PWC
San Diego the majority or managerial decision making would
take place during the A-ll budget formulation stage when
Cost Center Managers submit and discuss their budgets with
the Budget Review Board. Once the budget is approved,
financial controls should be implemented to minimize
discretionary spending.
C. FINANCIAL CONTROL RECOMMENDATIONS
The PWC San Diego must implement financial controls for
both major and minor maintenance together with designa-
tion of a single officer responsible for monitoring com-
pliance. The recommendations contained herein were
directed specifically at PWC San Diego, however, NAVFACENGCOM
approval/assistance will be required and there would be
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an application at all NIF activities.
Accruals are reported separately in the PWC Financial
and Operating Statements, but with insufficient detail or
controls. This was evidenced by incurring costs above
the project approval amounts as reported in the 30 September
1978 Report. NAVFAC should assist in establishing a
separate Cost Account for accruals associated with EMAR
.
A separate Cost Account would provide the control and
accountability necessary to insure funds are spent as
approved by higher authority. Accruals should never be
used to offset utility rate changes.
PWC San Diego should establish a separate Job Order
numbering system within each Cost Center, or FWC-wide, to
identify maintenance funds rather than simply including
them in the listing of overhead costs. The maintenance
funding level approved in each Cost Center's budget should
represent a "maintenance floor" with any spending less
than the approved amount requiring approval of the Com-
manding Officer or the Facilities Maintenance Manager.
Separate identification, control and reporting for
maintenance funding will also greatly facilitate trend
analysis and record keeping. Under the existing system,
it was impossible to identify with any accuracy the mainten-
ance patterns for FWC San Diego or sources and amounts of
money actually spent on BMAR work.
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The concept of command designated programs should be
continued at PWC San Diego. An example of this is the
Shop Improvement Program (SIP) , which will correct many
BMAR dificiencies. Command initiation and interest in
the SIP insures funds designated for the program will be
spent as intended. An expansion of the dedicated program
concept into other areas of major BMAR deficiencies will
greatly facilitate maintenance control efforts.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. BMAR Definition Inadequate
The definition and intended content of BMAR (pre-
viously BEMR) have changed several times since the early
1960's. The definitions of BMAR contained in the instruc-
tions available to reporting activities were incomplete
and inconsistent. Interpretations were not consistent
between or within reporting activities. This situation
meant a meaningful BMAR total for all activities could
not be generated.
2. BMAR Deficient As Indicator of Condition
Considering the nondeferrable portion of DC 1 and
2 as BMAR results in a condition indicator that represents
only a portion of the picture of facilities condition
(ie. that portion that is nondeferrable and correctable
by O&MN functional category M funds). By excluding DC 3
through 6 before considering deferrability , BMAR does not
even represent total nondeferrable deficiencies. BMAR
was an indicator of the need for O&MN maintenance funds,
BMAR was not a facilities condition indicator.
3. BMAR Overstated
As a result of inadequate BMAR definition, deficien-
cies not meeting the intended definition of BMAR were
included and BMAR was overstated. PWC San Diego reported
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its BMAR to be 76.1 million. NAVFAC considering only-
DC 1 and 2 restated PWC San Diego's BMAR as $M . 6 million.
Removing unprogrammed MILCON projects reduced this figure
to $10.8 million.
It can therefore be concluded that PWC San Diego
BMAR is in the neighborhood of $10 million (ie. not $40
million or $70 million) . This number does not consider
the significantly larger volume of non-BMAR deficiencies
which have been identified, should be reported and con-
sidered, and ultimately will have to be dealt with.
W. Inspection System Prone to Errors
The facilities inspection program at PWC San Diego
had several weaknesses which introduced errors in reporting.
Inspections were scheduled using a manual system under
which slippages occurred. When facilities were not in-
spected, reports were updated by an indexing method that
ignored deterioration occurring between inspections. A
shortage of permanent inspection personnel necessitated
the detailing of untrained and inexperienced personnel
from the production shops. The cost estimates prepared by
this system were questionable.
5- CPV Inaccurate
The reported current plant value (CPV) is not
accurate. The procedure of aggregating all capital im-
provement costs with the original construction cost of a
facility before indexing this total to present dollars
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introduced a significant upward bias to the CPV. Errors
in the Naval Facilities Assets data base compounded the
problem of determining an accurate CPV. This error resulted
from ineffective maintenance of the activity property
record cards.
6. Repair/Replace Decisions Uneconomically Made
The separation of MILCON and O&MN funding approval
chains for repair and for replacement prevented comparison
of alternatives on a life cycle cost basis. Efficient
allocation of resources could not result without such a
comparison.
7. Cost of Ownership Not Known
PWC San Diego had no data from which to determine
annual cost of ownership. The existing system did not
separate deferrable and nondeferrable work. Accurate
engineered performance standards were not compared against
actual performance by the labor force. Subjective eval-
uation by the cost center managers of what maintenance
work was required, was the key factor in the funds expended
on the annual cost of ownership. Maintenance funds were
not being spent to the full level budgeted.
8. No Central Control of EMAR Reduction
Actual overhead expenditures within cost centers
were discretionary within total budget. This resulted
in underspending amounts originally budgeted for maintenance,
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Selection of actual maintenance work to be accomplished
during the fiscal year was the decision of each cost center
manager. Other than the Shop Improvement Program, there
was no center-wide standard policy or command guidance on
determination of priorities or definition of deferrable
and nondeferrable work. The result was accomplishment of
nonessential work and a growth in BMAR.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Purify FWC San Diego BMAR
The following steps should be understood and
accomplished by PWC San Diego;
a. Remove DC 3 through 6 from BMAR
b. Remove unprogrammed MILCON from BMAR
c. Assign responsibility to a high level executive
or review board to screen and remove deferrable
projects from BMAR.
2. Revise Existing Instructions )
The existing instruction(s) covering BMAR should
be revised to include the following:
a. A clear unambiguous definition of BMAR as intended,
b. The DOD criteria for deferrability.
c. Some explanatory examples showing the applica-
tion of the criteria.
d. A statement that BMAR is only the non-deferrable
portion of DC 1 and 2.
e. Clarification of the distinction between BMAR





Specific assignement of responsibility to
screen for removal of deferrable deficiencies.
g. Specific assignment of responsibility to screen
for removal of projects to be accomplished
between 2 March and JO Sept. Require screening
to be based on either projected funding or
actual accomplishment, not both.
h. A method of including unprogrammed MILCON on the
annual inspection summary.
i. A requirement for Step 1 special project sub-
mission or preliminary MILCON submittal via the
Shore Facilities Planning System (SFPS) as ap-
propriate, prior to deficiency appearing on a
second year's AIS. This would reduce caprici-
ously identified deficiencies and encourage
identification of firm requirements.
Until revisions are made to the instructions, ALL
major claimants should provide specific written guidance
in these areas. An example of such guidance from a major
claimant which covers many of the points above has been
included as APPENDIX I.
3- Provide A Composite Condition Indicator
Provide a total facility condition indicator from
data available in the present system. Relable the AIS
Summary Report #2 to highlight total deficiencies regard-
less of funding process. Use the second AIS Summary Report
#2 already required to show the nondeferrable portion of
the total. (This would require screening for deferrability
of all deficiency codes.)
^. Improve Inspection System
Personnel conducting facilities maintenance inspec-
tions and preparing field estimates for use in the AIS
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should receive formal training. The practice of temporar-
ily detailing personnel from the production shops should
be discontinued in favor of a formal transfer of ceiling
points or contracting out at least a portion of the inspec-
tion effort.
5. Reestablish Use of EPS
PWC San Diego should reimplement the use of Engi-
neered Performance Standards (EPS) . Values found in the
old EPS documents should be updated to reflect current
practices and technology. Once implemented, the program
should be constantly monitored to retain accuracy.
6. Establish An Accurate Estimator of CPV
Develop a substitute factor which will provide a
more accurate CPV. Facility square footage could be used
and would be an easy data element to verify. This could
then be multiplied by a factor to predict current plant
value. The factors would be developed by considering key
elements including age, geographic location, type of con-
struction and use. Such factors could be purified annually
as their validity is established.
7. Make Utility Replacement A NIF Responsibility
PWCs should be given the authority to replace
utility systems at the end of their economic life through
the accrual process. Allowing NIF activities to fund
replacement projects would require Congressional approval.
Such approval would relinquish a jealously guarded Congres-
sional prerogative and is unlikely.
114

8. Determine Cost of Ownership
PWC San Diego must identify its actual annual cost
of ownership. Implementation of proper financial controls
over maintenance funds, use of EPS, accurate determina-
tion of deferrable and nondeferrable work are necessary
to identify this annual figure.
9. Establish The Position of Facilities Maintenance
Manager
PWC San Diego should assign responsibility and
authority to direct its maintenance management program to
a single individual. Application of limited PWC resources
must be coordinated to insure the most critical nondefer-
rable maintenance projects are accomplished first, irrespec-
tive of cost center location. This responsibility should
be placed with the Planning Officer.
10. Establish Financial Controls for BMAR Funds
It is recommended that the PWC San Diego establish
a separate Job Order numbering system to account for minor
maintenance funds, and the NAVFACENGCOM assist in estab-
lishing a new Cost Account for BMAR reduction accruals.
The center facilities maintenance manager should have
control of these funds with only he or the Commanding
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MEMORANDUM >X)R THE DIRECTOR, FISCAL MANAGEMENT DIVISION (OV-?-)
Subj: CF-44 Review of the MR? Portion of the KY EO
NIF A-ll Budget
1. As we have discussed, my staff is under taV ing a review of
the MRP portion of the jyjl^-lljh_uda_et . We have had several
general discussions of this subject in the past. Tt cay be
helpful for me to put some of my present thoughts in this
memorandum to be sure I am on the right track.
2. Starting in Kat
Inspection Summary
signs of what could
j3 i_ti_oo_o £ _t h_e_N a vy
'
*BKAR in excess of $
excess of $I80~m~Pn






artifically low sta biliz
1977, based upon our firs
fo r NIF activities, I beg
n t i ally be~a~*m"oj or pr obi em
plant property. The AIS
i 111 oriT ~~Tn e~T5 7 3 AIS , wit
reinforced my concern. A
ategory, revealed major de
aintar.ance and product! on
_
It appears that-our NIF cc



























3. I believe it can be safely assumed that some stabilized
rates will have to be raised if the NIF community is to accrue
sufficient resources ,to_maint a in _their_phy si cal _pl ant _at _the
_"minimum cost -of ownership" level without any reduction in the
backlog. I realize that the""Impa'ct of these increases "ill be
felt in the customer accounts and must be properly programmed.
The earliest this can be accomplished is in POM 81.
A. Because of the relatively large size of the backlog, the
best approach for its reduction is not so clear cut. Reduction
of the BMAR in a reasonable length of time (5 to 10 years) may
require significant increases in stabilized rates, increases
that may not be feasible. Two alternatives appear reasonable
to me:
a. Directly fund_CNM NIF_activi ti es with sufficient CW&i
"Tesbur ces__tp~_ eliminate the BMAR JLn a_systema"tic manner
over a reasonable length of time (say 5 years). Thi3
would have the advantage of establishing a dedicated
program_which would directly a_ttack the problem and ""bo
"relatively simple to execute and rnoniter. A disad-




precedent of "bailing out" our NIF activities from a
history of poor management practices. T r f-cocr,iie
that it is contrary to the NIF n.ar.agement concept.
b. A second method would be to establish jp_r at e_incr.ea.s_
a
of limited duration (say 5 years). The custocer ar-
SjotrrTts would be increased, and the funds injected into
the NIF activities through the overhead portion of the
higher stabilized rates. Such a procedure would *ork
fairly well with shipyard's, NARF's and PWC's, how-
ever, it may have little impact on ordnance activities
whose workload is on the decline, and which have a
large inventory of underutilized facilities.
5. Regardless of which method is finally select ed j th e problem
will _ha ve_to be addressed__in_t_he _dejy_eloo,:rj-nt _of_C?3y- Bf> Re- i
vising NIF stabilized rates to reflect the "minirtjiL cost of
ownership" will require an increase to customer accounts, and
elimination of the $180 million FY 80 BM.AR will require either
additional increases to customer accounts or a dedicated pro-
gram amount *" ~ """ "" ' "*" ""~ ~ " ' - ~
merits.
from FY 81 to FY 85. I would appeciate you r cors-








DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
omct. of the CHier or naval operation*
WA1MINOTOM. O C. tOJM
Ser 921C/56B465
10EC 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR SHORE FACILITIES PROGRAMMING D1VISI0I? (OP-44)
Subj: KRP for HIF Activities
8«f: (a) Your Memorandum of 21 Sept 1978 "
1. You have my full support in your efforts to bring out NIF plant up to
a reasonable state of repair. I share your view that the underfunding of this
maintenance has been so prolonged that it may take 3 to 5 years to "dig" our
way out. My preference would be to accomplish this through the HIT rather than
by a direct infusion of OSM.H into each HIF activity. However, this nay not
be feasible in sooe cases. Believe that we will -need to look into a dual
channeling of funds, > partial OiK.N infusion coupled with increased HIF
stabilised rates to fund the remainder. " -
2. I understand that Cdr Blondin has net with you and generally discussed the
problem. As I see it, our tasks ate to;
a. .Develop a phased funding requirement to restore a reasonable state qf
repair .and drive this requirecsent into the POM and FYDP.
b. * Determine what funding vehicle we will use to fund these requirements.
(1) Determine if a direct infusion from 06M,)? is appropriate and if so
in what amount and timeframe.
(2) Determine how the balance of the coats'vill be passed on to FT2F
customers. We could increese the rates of just the impacted K1F activities
or increase the ratas acrdss-tKe total HIF customer range.
« •
"
C. Put esch NIP activities' rates on a track which funds the "minimum cost
of ownership" each veer. ......
3. Recommend that our staffs get together on the problem , confirm its approxi-
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TOTAL FY 78 UNCORRECTED DEFICIENCIES
ofiiviist 11010.14
21 JUN 1977





1. ACTIVITY (N*mt amd Lmmamml 1. UJ.C
—
NAVFAC/CNM










t AVIATION OPERATION FACILITIES
—...
t
I COMMUNICATIONS OPERATION FACILITIES 30,400
J WATERFRONT OPERATION FACILITIES




• OTHER MAINTENANCE/PRODUCTION 303,330 2,284,750
• RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT. TEST A EVALUATION




M ADMINISTRATIVE 16,290 104,800
If TROOP HOUSING/MESSING FACILITIES
1* OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPLY A SERVICES 42,550
17 UTILITIES 842,830 5,860,410
10 REAL ESTATE AND GROUND STRUCTURES " 7,600 86,100
SUBTOTAL •1, 296, 250 •8,336,060
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PWC SAN PI ECO
GENERAL PURPOSE OF PROGRAM
Navy Public Works Center (PWC), San Diego is actively pursuing a long
standing program of developing utilities systems engineering/economic
Studies for all activities under its cognizance. The broad objective
of these studies is the establishment, on a valid basis, of detailed
master plans of action for more effective management in the production,
purchase, operation, maintenance, replacement/expansion, utilization.
and conservation of utilities and utilities systems, all on a "systems
approach" basis and in the framework of life-cycle cost and energy
usage minimization.
SPECIFIC PROGRAM COALS
1. 'Development of knowledge of utilities systems Including their
condition and capability and updating of system drawings.
2. Improvement of system operation procedures.
3. Providing basis for more efficient planning, operation, and
maintenance.
4. Identification and definition of valid projects for funding by
accrual, urgent MCON, MCON', ECIP, UIP, or any other appropriate
funding avenue.
5. Providing a valid basis for orderly planning for replacement
of deteriorated systems and for serving future requirements at




6. Identification of specific Improvements in the areas of energy
conservation and safety.
STUDY METHODOLOGY
Studies are accomplished by bofh ir.-house and consulting engineer
effort. Those studies performed by consulting enginoars require
considerable in-house engineering and operational personnel suppoi.*
in order to be of maximum value. In all cases, studies generally
include the following steps:
1. Records search of utility systems data.
2. Field investigations of utilities systems.
3. Preparation of updated utility systems drawings.
4. Development of historical data drawings.
5. Preparation of operational schematic drawings.
6. identification of system deficiencies and repair projects.
.7. Analysis of system capacity (existing and planned)
8. Economic evaluation of alternatives.




*• FACILITIES INVESTMENT CATEGORIES
a. Clarification of Shore Establishment Facilities
The Navy's shore establishment Includes a wide range of
different facilities which contribute to Navy missions In a large
number of different ways. To describe the relationships between
facilities and missions a classification of these facilities Into
Investment Categories with related contributions to missions has






6. Aviation Maintenance and Production
7. Shipyard Maintenance and Production
8. Other Maintenance and Production
9. RDT&E
10. POL Storage and Supply
11. Ammunition Storage and Supply
12. Other Storage and Supply
13. Medical
14. Administration
15. Troop Housing and Messing
16. Other Personnel Support and Service
17. Utilities











From: Chiof of Naval Education and Training
To: Distribution List
Subj : Preparation and submission of FY 80 Annual Inspection Summary
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 11010.34 of 21 Jun 1977
(b) OPNAVINST 11010.23D of 15 Mar 1977




Enel: (1) 0PNAV Form 11010/4 Type A Annual Inspection Summary of -*|
Uncorrected Facilities Deficiencies —
;
(2) 0PNAV 11010/3 Type A Annual Inspection Summary Transmittal Form
(3) "Example" - Assessment of Conditon and Mission Impact
Statement
for DC1 and DC2 By Investment Category
(4) Investment Category Identification 4 Cross Reference
(5) Deficiency Code Table
1. A Type "A" Annual Inspection Summary, as per reference (a), is
required from all activities that perform or have the responsibility for
maintenance and repair of Navy owned and operated property. Tenants who
have no plant account, but have the responsibility to maintain and
repair the plant account they use, as written in their host/tenant
agreement, shall prepare an Annual Inspection Summary cji if available
shall submit a copy of the hosts' Annual Inspection Summary with the
items designated upon which they have funding responsibility for mainte-
nance and repair. Care should be taken to ensure that this property la
not reported by both host and tenant.
2/ Reference (a) changed the effective date of the Annual Inspection
Summary (AIS) to 1 March 1978, (cut-off point) and submission to higher
echelons. Accordingly, activity Annual Inspection Summaries (AIS's) are
to be submitted to CNET and to applicable functional commanus by 15
March 1978. Functional commands will submit to CNET not later tnan
1 Ap-ril im.
i
3. CNET has established a computerized system to receive and consoli-
date all the information as received from the activities on the 0PNAV
Form 11010/4 Type "A" Annual Inspection Summary of Uncorrected
Facilities Deficiencies. The 0PNAV Forms 11010/5 and 11010/6, Reports 1
and 2, and the Cost Account to Investment Category Summary will not be
required from the activities for this FY 80 AIS submission. All of the
data that i3 required by CNET to comply with references (a) and (b) will
be derived from the activities accurate and timely submissions of
enclosures (1), (2) and (3) forms.
126

APPENDIX I Code Q17/09B2
01 FEB 1979
Subj : Preparation and .submission of F¥ Annual Inspection Summary
4. In order for the computerized system to work properly it is
important that accurate and complete Type "A" Annual Inspection Forma be
submitted by the activities. Shown below is the "Validation Criteria"
that must be followed or the computer will reject the entire AIS or
reject that line entry on the AIS. There are nineteen (19) blocks or
columns on the OPNAV Form 11014/4 Type "A" - AIS form - the item numbers
shown below refer to the block or column number on this form that will
be validated:
Item 2 - oust have valid UIC no.
Item 6 - must have 50 or less digits including blank spaces
Item 7 - must be present (numeric) for each complete entry
Item 10 - must have 1804, 1205, or 9999
Item 11 - must be present (numeric)
Item 12 - must be present for D.C.1 and D.C.2 line entries
Item 13 - must be present (numeric) for D.C.1 D.C.2
and must match
Enclosure (4) I. C. /Cross Reference
Item 16 - (a) must be present (numeric); must be 1, 2, 3. 4, 5, or 6
(b) If D.C.1 is shown: column 9 must be blank and column 10
must be 1804
(c) If D.C.2 is shown: column 17 must be $25 (000) or more
and column 10 must be 1804
(d) If D.C.3 is shown: column 17 must be less than 1 1*5 (000)
and column 10 must be 1804
(e) If D.C.4 is shown: column 17 must be $15 (000) or more
(f) If D.C.5 is shown: column 17 must be less than $25. (000);
column 10 must be 1804; column 13 must show 7840
(cost account)
(g) If D.C.6 is shown: column 17 must be $ 2*5 (000) or more :







Sub j : Preparation and auDraiaaion of b'¥ Annual Inspection Summary
Item 17 -
Item 19 -
must be $1 (000) or more; no decimals shown and all
numeric entries represent dollars in thousands (000)
If this line entry is "non-deferrable" leave felan&
if this is a "deferrable " line entry put "P_" Jx Column 19
Refer to enclosure (5) Deficiency Code Table for more details.
5. The CNO defination for "Urgent Non-Deferrable" is two fold as follows:
A. The deficiency is mission critical and deferral of corrective
action beyond the current fiscal year will adversely impact readiness ox
B. The deficiency is expected to result in accelerated
facility/equipment/material deterioration, and deferral of corrective
action beyond the current fiscal year will have an adverse economic
Impact
.
Non-critical items such as routine interior painting, long term roof
repairs or replacements where the roof is not leaking and projected long
term repairs or maintenance of class 1 and 2 property may be shown as
"Deferrable" DC1 and DC2 items.
6. Uncorrected Facilities Deficiencies should include all known defi-
ciencies that require correction and are not accomplished as of 1 March.
The activity submission of the AIS will identify which deficiencies are
"Deferrable" as shown above and DO NOT require correction during the
current fiscal year by placing a "D" in column 19 of the Type A Annual
Inspection Summary of Uncorrected Facilities Deficiencies Form 0PNAV
11010/4. No deficiency items less than $1,000 shall be included. Do
not include decimal cents or zeros — round to the nearest $1,000 to be
shown as $1. Refer to efficiency codes shown in enclosure (5).
7. Special projects to be performed by contract for which the "Notice
of Award" has not been issued by 1 March are considered "not accom-
plished." Job orders authorized and forwarded to the Maintenance
Division on or before 1 March are considered "accomplished."
Uncorrected facilities deficiencies which require replacement by mil-
itary construction and have been Included on the Military Construction
"Requirement List" ( RL) and officially listed on the activity's planning
form 0PNAV 11000/4 "Project for Correction of Facility Deficiency,"
should be reported. Particular attention shall be given to entries of
funding source Code 1205 to insure that the line item of work is a
proper charge to Military Construction funds. Basically, only defi-






SubJ : Preparation and submission of FY Annual Inspection Summary
8. It has been noted that many of the deficiency Code 2 - Special
Projects reported in the FY 79 AIS have not been submitted as special
projects. Since the special projects portion accounts for approximately
58> of the total backlog, it becomes ever-increasingly important that
these special projects be documented by Step I submissions. Without
this supporting budget documentation, CNET is at a definite disadvantage
to justify increases in MRP funding. Accordingly, timely submission of
your Deficiency Code 2, backlog deficiencies as Step I "Special
Projects," in accordance with reference (c), is a very important part of
the RPMA management concept.
9. In addition to enclosures (1) and (2) required by reference (a),
activities will prepare enclosure (3) assessment (by investment cate-
gory) of the facilities' conditions under their cognizance and an evalu-
ation of the mission impact of those deficiencies left uncorrected.
This is in accordance with reference (b) and an "example™ format is
shown as enclosure (3). Tenant commands not holding plant account will
address those facilities which the addressee has the maintenance/repair
responsibility in accordance with a written host/tenant agreement.
Under such situations, a copy of the host/tenant agreement la requested.
10. Summary of submission requirements for the activity and functional
commands are as follows:
a. Activities will submit a completed copy of all forms and data to
CNET and
,
also to their applicable functional command by 15 March 1979 as
follows
:
(1) Type A Annual Inspection Transmittal Form. (Enclosure (2))
(2) OPNAV Form 1 10 10/4 Type A Annual Inspection Summary of
Uncorrected Facilities Deficiencies. (Enclosure (1))
(3) Assessments of Condition and Mission Impact Statements for
DC1 and DC2 (combined) by« Investment Category. (Enclosure (3))
i
b. Functional Commands will receive copies of all activity sub-
missions and will consolidate the "Assessments of Condition and Mission
Impact Statements" into a Functional Command summary as per enclosure
(3) format. Functional Commands will review all activities Annual
Inspection Summaries (enclosure (1)) for accuracy, completness and com-
patibility with the "Validation Criteria" as shown in paragraphs 3 and 4
above. They will closely review the "Deferrable" and "Non-Deferrable"








Subj : Preparation and submission of fi Annual Inspection Summary
c. CNET will distribute copies of the activities computerized OPNAtf
Forms 11010/5 and 11010/b - Reports 1 and 2 to all applicable activities
and functional commands.
11. The data contained in the AIS Summaries and in the assessment of
condition/mission impact statements forms a vital part of the forth-
coming budget process. The accuracy and clarity of the data in this
submission will form the basis for the MRP funding in future years and
could greatly improve the MRP funding climate if reliable data is pro-
vided .
12. Chief of Naval Education and Training point of contact for RPMA and
AIS is Mr. J. Heyen and for special projects is Mr. J. Langston. Either
oan be reached on AUT0V0N 922-4146 or FTS prefix 948-4146.
Dy direction.
Distribution (CNETINST 5216. 1C):
List I (less 8 4 9); List II (less 7, 8, 9 & 10);
List IV (less 3, 5 through 15, 25 through 29, 32,
34, 37, 41, 45, 46, 48 through 52); List V; List VI;
List VIII
COMFLETRAGRU , Pearl Harbor, HI




COMPACNAVFACENGCOM, Pearl Harbor, HI
CO, NORTHNAVFACENCCOM, Philadelphia, PA
CO, CHESUAVFACENCCOM, Washington, D.C.
CO, SOUTHNAVFACENGC0M, Charleston, SC
CO, WESTNAVFACENCCOM, San Bruno, CA
CO, PWC, Pensacola, FL
CO, PWC, Great Lakes, IL
CO, PWC, San Diego, CA
CO, PWC, Norfolk, VA
CO, PWC, San Francisco, CA





Aviation Operation Facilities "
($000)
%• exfi/nPJ-JL
Condition and Mission Impact of BMAR
During the past year an unusually cold and wet winter has accelerated
the rate of deterioration to the point where pavements, already in a state of
deterioration, are beginning to fall rapidly. Scarcity of funds in the past
several years has precluded expenditure of adequate dollars to make extensive
necessary repairs to pavements. Only the most emergency repairs could be
nade with available funds.
Runway, taxiway, parking apron, and blast pad pavements present a
continuous maintenance and repair problem due to age, high usage, soil
makeup and climate. Conditions which exist generally throughout the
HAVEDTRACOM in airfield paving are spalls, cracks, joint seal deterioration,
irregular surfaces, pot holes, sinks, low areas, large areas blown out by
engine blasts, loose gravel, vegetation growing in and near the paving,
markings worn and obliterated, rubber deposits, poor drainage, and erosion.
Airfield lighting and navigational aids require repairs to wiring
and circuits due to increasing frequency of failures and outages. Expensive
radar air traffic control and electronic equipment are susceptible to
damage due to leaking roofs in control towers and hangars.
The majority of the Operations buildings and structures, of V/orld
War II and prior vintage, are in generally poor condition and are pro-
gressively eeteriorating.
Impact
Aviation operational facilities are vital to the mission of the NAVEDTRACCM.
Lack of adequate repairs to these facilities results in unacceptable flight
support conditions and seriously degrades and diminishes the efficiency of
this mission. If airfield pavements are not maintained and repaired on a
continuing basis, rapid deterioration of the base and pavement sets in
(which results in even greater expenditures for repairs, more frequent
downtime for spot repairs, and loss of aircraft serviceability due to damages
or accidents. Loose paving matter or joint seal causes severe and expensive
foreign object damage (FOO) to highly sensitive jet engines. Airfield
lighting and navigational aids are essential both to the training of the
student and for his safety. Lack of dependability of these facilities could
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1.296.967.9 115,649,347.19 I 06. VC2 .0*5.00
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Public Senior Colleges and Uni'vorsit ies
1979-81 Bienniura
For each year of the biennium maintenance cost
factors times building replacement costs equa 1
s
dollar request for Building Maintenance
A. Maintenance cost factors are designated as follows (factors expressed
as percentage figures):
Wood-Frame Masonry-Wood.,, Masonry-Concrete, /
Construct i on— Construct i on— Construction —
Air Conditioned 1.90 1.4S 1.25
Non-Air Conditioned 1.7S 1.30 1.10
B. Building replacement cost shall be determined by applying the factors for
\
the specific classes of construction, as shown on Ma r k e 1 ' s Handy Appraisal
Chart
y
to the original construction costs of each educational, general !
and service building. Buildings to be included are as follows:
Fiscal Year 1980
Include buildings which will be completed and carried on the books of the
institution as of August 31, 1980. The portion of the total 1980 request
for Building Maintenance for buildings to be accepted between September 1,
1979 and August 31, l'J80 should be clearly shown as a subtotal. The
portion of the total 1980 request for Building Maintenance on buildings
completed between September 1, 1979 and August 31, 1980 should be multi-
plied by a factor of X/12 where X equals the number of months during fiscal
year 1980 that Building Maintenance will be required on such new buildings.
Fiscal Year 1981
Include buildings which will be completed and carried on the books of the
institution as of August 31, 1931. The portion of the total 1981 request
for Building Maintenance for buildings to be accepted between September 1,
1980 and August 31, 198 1 should be clearly shown as a subtotal. The
portion of the total 1981 request for Building Maintenance on buildings
completed between September 1, 1980 and August 31, 1981 should be multi-
plied by a factor of X/12 where X equals the number of months during fiscal
year 1981 that Building Maintenance will be required on such new buildings.
Designated as "Frame" on Market's Handy Appraisal Chart .
Designated as "Semi - F ireproof" on Market's Handy Appraisal Chart . '. (i
Designated as "Fireproof" on Mark el ' s Handy Ap praisal Chart . •"'
Published by Markel Appraisal Chart Company, Cincinnati 2, Ohio as of










Public Senior Colleges and Universities
1979-81 Biennium
For each year of the biennium:
SW (.70P 122L .SOE)
Definitions of terms used in the formula:
1. SW is the average hourly earnings for services
(adjusted) for January, 1978 as shown in the
Survey of Current Business published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce.
2. P is the total linear feet of perimeter of all
campus buildings including academic, office,
service, administration, dormitories, etc. For
fiscal year 1980 include all buildings which
will be completed and carried on the books of the
institution as of August 31, 1979. For fiscal
year 1981 include all buildings which will be
completed and carried on the books of the insti-
tution as of August 31, 1980.
3. L is the total number of acres of lawns and
regularly maintained areas (malls, flower beds, parking
lot--, sidewalks, streets . etc.). Exclude all buildings,
street areas, and areas covered under Organized Activities
(i.e. college farms). For fiscal year 1980 include
applicable acres as of August 31, 1979. For fiscal year
1981 include applicable acres as of August 31, 1980.









Public Senior Colleges unci Universities
1979-81 B i cnniuui
For Fiscal Year 1980:
GSF .
SW x 22,400 x 2080 x 1.2
For Fiscal Year 1981:
GSF
SW x I x 22,400 x 2080 x 1.2
Definitions of terms used in the formula:
i sw is the average hourly earnings for services
(adjusted) for January. 1978
l
" I sLvr! in "e'Lrvey o_f Current Business published by the Bureau of tconomie
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
2 . I represents labor and material
inflation factor. For fiscal year 1981 this
factor is 1.064.
3. GSF is gross square feet (outside
dimensions) of educational, general, and
service buildings.
between September 1*1979 and August 51, 1980 should be
clearly shown as a
subtotal.
Cnr -,„_,, year 1981 include buildings completed and
carried on the books
of"'thTn Nation as of August 31, 1980 plus the gross area of sue
Sinular
buildings completed between September 1, 1980,
and August 31 198 £±ra|S
a factor of J/12 where X equals the
number of months during fiscal year
1981 that Custodial Services will be required
in such new buildings Tie
Li-stou
requCst for Custodial Services for new buildings
r^coupled betweeXteSr 1, 1980 and August 31, 1981 should be
clearly shown as a subtotal.
„* rh, Custodial Services formula "educational, general,
and service
performed by persons other than those whose
salaries are p 31 d out of tunds
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* These deficiencies if left uncorrected are likely to
become NMAR.
** Screening is accomplished first by the activity
Commanding Officer then the major claimant.
*** Major claimants have a strong voice, via the funding
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AIS (March 76) AIS (March 77) AIS (March 78) AIS (March 79 > AIS
(March 8(
TOTAL PWC BMAR
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PWC SAN diego ais reporting flow chart























*Any of thes three may
sign out the AIS (usually


































1. Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 11010.34,
Subject: Annual Inspection Summary; Instruction for
Preparation and Submission Of , 21 June 1977
2. Department of Defense, DOD INSTRUCTION 4-150. 9,
Subject: Annual Report on Real Property Maintenance
Activities , 29 March 1966.
*~
3. Morrison, P. A. , Backlog of Essential Maintenance and
Repair (BEMAR) as an Indicator of Real Property
Condition
,
Master of Public Works and Master of Science
in Civil Engineering Thesis, University of Pittsburgh,
1970.
4. Director, Shore Facilities Programming Division -
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (0P-44)i Real
Property Issue, POM 80 (FY 80 - 84) , February 1978~T^
5. Chief of Naval Operations Message CN0 R241945Z Mar 78
to AIG Four Four Subject: Real Property Inspection
Summary Submission Procedures; Clarification of
,
24 March 1978.
6. Tomsho, George M. , Navy Public Works Management Study
,
University of Pittsburgh Graduate Center for Public
Works Engineering and Administration, Summer 1977.
7- Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 11010. 23D,
Subject: Management of Real Property Maintenance
Activities
, 15 March 1977. (Including CH - 2 of
10 July 78)
.
8. Richard Earl, Head, RPMA Branch (Code 1003) Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria, Va.
,
Interviews on various dates 14 and 16 November 1978;
16, 26, and 30 January, 8 February and 15 March 1979.
9- Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 11010. 20C,
Subject: Facilities Projects Manual
,
30 May 1974.
10. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Memorandum 1052B/
WWS 7112 to Code 101, Subject: FY 78 Annual Inspection
Narrative Assessment and Impact Statements for Navy




11. Public Works Center San Diego Transmittal OPNAV form
11010/3(3-77) to Commander, Naval Facilities Engi-
neering Command Subject: Type A Annual Inspection
Summary Transmittal
, 30 March 1978.
12. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Comp-
troller, Navy Industrial Fund Reporting System
,
Period Ended 30 September 1978
, 30 September 1978.
13. Department of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, SECNAV
INSTRUCTION 11014. 11A, Subjects POD Real Property
Maintenance Activities Program
, 5 August 1976.
14. U.S., Department of Defense, POD Real Property
Maintenance Activities Program"! Directive 4165-2,
21 Feb 1976.
15- Lieutenant Commander T.B. Michna, Planning Officer,
Public Works Center, San Diego, California, inter-
view of 15 February 1979-
16. Public Works Center, San Diego Letter 100s TBM:
wpc 11000 Serial 00216 to Commander, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Subject: Maintenance of Real
Property (MRP) for Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) Ac^~
tivities
, 2 February 1979-
17. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, A' Study of the
Current Plant Value/Replacement Cost of Class II -
Facilities, Part I and II , by J.J. Carberry and
J.M. Stine, June 1978.
18. Dr. J. Cox, PhD, Associate Vice President for Admin-
istration, California State College, Sacramento,
interview of 5 December 1978.
19- Mr. J. Burfield, Capt. , CEC.USN, (Ret.), Director of
Maintenance Programs, University of California, San
Diego, interview of 12 December 1978.
20. Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller,
NAVS0 P - 1718, Subject: Navy Industrial Fund Hand-
book for Public Works Centers
, September 1972.
21. Navy Public Works Center, San Diego NOTICE 7030, Subject;
FY 1979 and FY 1980 Utility, Other Services, Transpor-







1. Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station 2
Alexandria, Virginia 2231^
2. Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School 2
Monterey, California 939^0
3. Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center 1
Fort Lee, Virginia 238OI
4. Department Chairman, Code 5^
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School 1
Monterey, California 939^0
5. CDR. J.M. Shiels, Code 5^ SC
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School 1
Monterey, California 939^0
6. LCDR R.B. Cunningham, Code 5^ CN
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School 1
Monterey, California 939^0
7. Commander Naval Facilities Engineering
Command
Head RPMA Branch (Code 1003) 2
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22332
8. Commander Naval Facilities Engineering
Command
Assistant- Commander for PWCs (Code 15)
200 Stovall Street 2
Alexandria, Virginia 22332
9. Commander Naval Facilities Engineering
Command
Assistant Commander for PWCs 2
PWC Industrial Management Division
Naval Station Box 205





Navy Public Works Center San Diego
San Diego, California 92136












c «' Backlog of maintenance
and repair (BMAR) at
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